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W H A T  W E ’ V E  G O T
Ever since the Boston Tea Party—which was, after all, about taxes, not tea—tax revolts have shaped politics on 
this continent. No wonder. Taxes not only claim billions of 
dollars from citizens; they also inﬂuence billions of daily 
decisions—shaping, or misshaping, the economy.
In general, economics tells us that when you tax 
something, you get less of it. Our problem is that we tax 
things we want more of, such as paychecks and enterprise, 
instead of things we want less of, such as toxic waste and 
resource depletion. Naturally, we get less money and more 
messes. Tax Shift is about doing the opposite—removing 
taxes from “goods” and putting them on “bads.” This book 
is not about raising or lowering taxes overall. Whether you 
think government is too big, too small, or just right, tax 
shifting is a revolt that makes sense: it gets taxes off our 
backs and onto our side.
A tax shift would allow us to reduce or eliminate 
many existing taxes: regressive property, payroll, and sales 
taxes that are hardest on the lower and middle classes; 
enterprise-killing business taxes; even the mind-boggling 
personal income tax. Instead, by building on a rudimentary 
framework of existing minor levies, we could tax actions 
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that corrode the public good. We could tax emissions of 
deadly ﬁne particles, greenhouse gases, and other air pol-
lutants; discharges of toxic heavy metals and other water 
pollutants; and the manufacture and use of pesticides and 
other hazardous chemicals. We could tax away most trafﬁc 
jams, by charging drivers for use of major routes at rush 
hour. We could protect natural ecosystems by taxing the 
pumping of fresh water, the impounding of rivers behind 
dams, and the felling of virgin timber. Finally, by moving 
the weight of the property tax off buildings and onto urban 
land values, we could promote the growth of compact, 
walkable neighborhoods and slow the creep of our suburbs 
into farms and forests.
Shifting the tax burden would send out powerful 
signals—signals that would reorient consumption and 
production in our homes and businesses. Tax shifting 
would harness the proﬁt motive for environmental ends 
and wring out the waste of resources. Governments would 
still get their money, and—because taxes on “bads” do not 
bog down the economy as much as many existing taxes on 
“goods”—employment levels and incomes would rise.
In economic terms, a tax shift would take taxes off 
labor and capital and put them on the third factor of 
production—resources, the gifts of nature. Labor refers to 
people working. Capital means physical objects created by 
people, such as buildings, tools, and machinery. The gifts of 
nature are resources not made by people, such as air, forests, 
fossil fuels, land, metals, water, a stable climate, and rivers 
and other habitats. Taxing labor and capital tells businesses 
and households to scrimp on workers and tools—in other 
words, to practice underemployment and underinvestment. 
Taxing the gifts of nature (or, more precisely, taxing actions 
that degrade the gifts of nature) tells people to conserve 
these gifts.
Taxes on resources correct one of the most glaring 
ﬂaws of market economies: blindness to environmental 
costs. Failure to charge for the use of the atmosphere as a 
receptacle for poisonous gases, for example, results in too 
much air pollution. Failure to charge for the disruption of 
watersheds results in too many ﬂoods. Yet for individual 
ﬁrms, there is no place in the ledger for the environmental 
costs of production that fall on others—costs such as dam-
age of a worker’s DNA that causes disease decades later, 
the draining of a wetland that offers wildlife habitat, or 
the release of toxic substances so mobile they eventually 
permeate the breast milk of women in the Arctic. Environ-
Dear Reader,
Merely reading the words tax and policy in the 
same sentence can cause a person’s eyes to 
glaze. We’ve tried to keep things interest-
ing, but if your eyes do glaze, just remem-
ber what’s at stake: the environment, the economy, and—if 
you’re part of an average northwestern household—almost 
$20,000 in all forms of taxes each year.1 (We use the word 
taxes in connection with all policies that generate government 
funds. For the sake of variety or historical accuracy, though, 
we will occasionally call them levies or charges.)
Read on. A tax shift might save you a bundle.
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mental taxes put these costs—or at least crude monetary 
approximations of them—on the books.
The prospect of aiding both economy and environment 
has sparked modest tax shifts in the Netherlands, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and three Scandinavian countries 
since 1991. In North America, this trend has yet to take 
hold. The history of tax politics on this continent suggests 
that adopting a reform for the ﬁrst time in the ﬁrst place 
is harder than spreading it to ten others, so road testing a 
tax shift on this side of the Atlantic could quickly set off 
similar reforms across the United States and Canada.2
This book attends to one possible test plot—the Paciﬁc 
Northwest, deﬁned as the region whose rivers run into the 
Paciﬁc Ocean through North America’s temperate rain 
forests. Home to 15 million people, this region stretches 
from Alaska’s Prince William Sound to the redwood coast 
of California and inland to headwaters as far east as the 
Rocky Mountains. More than twice the size of Texas, it 
encompasses British Columbia, Idaho, Oregon, and Wash-
ington, along with neighboring parts of Alaska, California, 
and Montana (see map inside front cover). The region 
combines traditions of political innovation and environ-
mental conservation.
In the Northwest, taxes claimed $107 billion in 1996, 
one-third of the gross regional product. (When we report 
data for the Northwest as a whole in this book, we exclude 
the states only partially within the region.) Some $89 bil-
lion of that money came from taxes on labor and capital, 
mostly in the form of payroll taxes, personal income taxes, 
corporate income and other business taxes, and sales and 
property taxes. Just 17 percent of revenue collected came 
from taxes on resources. The largest of these were the 
part of the property tax that falls on land, rather than on 
buildings, and the gas tax. Others included health-oriented 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco, small energy taxes, pollution 
taxes, and motor vehicle fees. Elsewhere in the tax codes, 
meanwhile, environmentally damaging activities including 
Taxing Logic?
Combined tax rate on each dollar  
of take-home pay for a middle- 
income Oregon family .................................. 31%
Tax rate on each dollar spent on  
pesticides in Oregon .........................................0%
Combined tax rate on proﬁts of major service  
businesses in British Columbia ................................................... 46%
Average tax on each of the 2.8 billion pounds of industrial  
air and water pollutants emitted annually in B.C. ..................0.3¢
Washington business tax rate on each dollar received  
by a public or nonproﬁt hospital .............................................. 1.5%
Washington business tax rate on each dollar received  
by a nuclear fuel manufacturer ........................................... 0.275%
Share of income a poor California family pays  
in state and local taxes ................................................................. 12%
Tax rate on old-growth timber cut in California ....................3%
Sources: see note 3.
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Death and Taxes
Air and water pollution and other envi-
ronmental contaminants killed at least 3,400 
people, possibly three times as many, in the 
Paciﬁc Northwest in 1996. Motor vehi-
cles—the worst air polluters—killed another 1,991 in crashes. 
(Some 253 of them were pedestrians.) Smoking killed about 
21,400. Some 5,800 people died from alcohol consumption.7
These ﬁgures are based on statistics. We cannot pick out all 
the victims’ names from the list of the 106,923 people—2,248 
of them children—who died in the Northwest in 1996. But the 
best available evidence suggests that 31,800 did die of these 
less-than-natural causes and that for every person who died, 
many more were maimed, handicapped, or sickened.8
A tax shift that discouraged polluting, driving, smoking, 
and drinking would have saved some of these lives. So in a 
way, the existing tax system—by failing to penalize dangerous 
acts—is implicated in these deaths. Tax policy’s sin is one of 
omission, not commission, but the victims are just as dead. This 
unexpected collusion of the tax man and the grim reaper adds 
a sinister new twist to Benjamin Franklin’s old observation, 
“Nothing in this world is certain but death and taxes.”9
driving, logging, and mining received special subsidies. 
(NEW describes these subsidies in a companion volume, 
Hazardous Handouts: Taxpayer Subsidies to Environmental 
Destruction. See inside back cover.)4
Because taxes on labor and capital are high in the 
Northwest as elsewhere, the prices of housing and labor are 
higher than they should be. So are the prices of things that 
use labor intensively, such as medical care and education. 
In both the United States and Canada, the combination 
of income taxes and payroll taxes (such as unemployment 
insurance) puts a tax burden on paychecks that usually 
exceeds 30 percent. For a worker to get $1,000 in after-tax 
pay, she and her employer must write checks worth $300 
or more to the government. These taxes effectively penalize 
hiring and working and push the economy to use fewer 
workers instead of fewer natural resources.5
Levies on capital and labor squelch investment and 
worker effort. Every dollar raised through taxes on capital 
or labor reduces economic output by dampening pro-
ductivity. Overall, taxes affecting the Northwest cause 
so-called deadweight losses of about 24 cents per dollar 
collected. All together, these losses come to approximately 
$26 billion annually in the region, equal to 8 percent of 
economic output.6
A tax shift revolt in the Northwest may not come 
easily. The idea is still new and unfamiliar; existing taxes, 
though products of a history of errors, have the force of 
custom behind them. Fortunately, reforms need not occur 
all at once. A tax shift can proceed in steps, and each step 
will strengthen the economy while helping the environ-
ment. In the end, the practical challenge is one of public 
education and political organizing, and the organizing may 
come more easily than expected. After all, we have much 
to lose—needless death and suffering, unnecessary poverty 
and unemployment, endangerment of the landscape, and 
tax laws that punish virtues while rewarding vices.
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Idaho Jones and the 
Taxes of Doom
Meet Idaho Jones and his sisters: British Co-
lumbia Jones, Oregon Jones, and Washington 
Jones. They aren’t real people, of course. But they could be. 
They are statistically average representatives of the Northwest 
in general and of their state or province in particular. Now ap-
proaching his thirty-third birthday, Idaho Jones is the baby of 
the family. B.C. and Oregon Jones are the eldest at 36. Wash-
ington is 34. (Half the people in each state or province are 
older than the Jones namesake; half are younger.) All are mar-
ried and have one child (except for B.C., who has two). Idaho 
and his wife have a ten-year-old named Jessica—the most 
popular baby name in the year of her birth. A rarity, Idaho was 
born in the state where he lives now; the other Joneses take 
after their parents, who moved around a lot.10
 The Jones family ﬁnances are, well, average. Idaho and 
his wife earn $40,500 a year—the state’s median household 
income for non-elderly married couples. Oregon and Wash-
ington have household incomes in the mid- to high 40s. B.C. 
Jones and her husband earn Can$55,000 (about US$40,000). 
The Joneses don’t get to spend all that money, though. In ad-
dition to federal income and payroll taxes, the Jones siblings 
pay about 10 percent of their household incomes in state, 
provincial, and local taxes. Those $3,000–$6,000 disappear in 
different ways: Oregon Jones, for instance, pays state income 
tax but no sales tax, while Washington does the opposite. 
In exploring the often murky labyrinth of tax policies in the 
Northwest, we’ll ask the Joneses to help us keep up with how 
taxes affect “average” northwesterners.11
H O W  W E  G O T  I T
How we collect revenue is an accident of history spring-ing from a history of accidents. Even a cursory review 
debunks the notion that very much sustains the present 
regime besides force of habit. It also uncovers valuable 
lessons for would-be tax shifters.
Our tax laws were cobbled together through a century 
and a half of political compromises and special pleading. 
They are revealing maps of past convenience and vulner-
ability: when revenues were needed, legislators sought the 
most convenient means of extracting funds, which usually 
meant dunning those least able to resist. As Louis XIV’s 
ﬁnancial advisor, Jean Baptiste Colbert, once said, “The art 
of taxation consists in so plucking the goose as to obtain 
the largest possible amount of feathers with the smallest 
possible amount of hissing.” Big changes have come largely 
during times of crisis, and even then voters have usually cast 
tax ballots based on perceptions of their own immediate 
self-interest. Equally important, tax policy rests on custom. 
People have mostly accepted what they were used to, so 
politicians tell one another, “The best tax is an old tax.”12
The end point of this ad hoc process is a tax system 
with only one coherent goal: capturing money. It took in 
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How to Tell a Good Tax 
from a Bad Tax
We evaluate taxes on the basis 
of four criteria:
Economy: Does the tax 
encourage or discourage enterprise, growth in productivity, 
and job creation? Speciﬁcally, does the tax cause what econ-
omists call a “deadweight loss”: a loss of economic output 
caused by distorted incentives created by the tax? Taxes on 
wages, for example, discourage people from working. Taxes 
on investment discourage people from investing. Both reduce 
economic output.
Equity: Does the tax fall on people in proportion to their 
ability to pay? Progressive taxation attempts to equalize 
sacriﬁce instead of simple percentages by taking a larger pro-
portion of income from higher-income households than from 
poorer ones. Regressive taxes, by contrast, take a larger share 
of income from middle-class and poor households than from 
afﬂuent ones. Because the cost of some taxes is passed on 
from the initial taxpayer to others, assessing fairness requires 
paying attention to who ultimately feels the tax bite.
Environment: Does the tax encourage or discourage resource 
conservation and pollution prevention? Does the tax correct 
the failure of the market to reﬂect environmental costs, such 
as pollution’s effects on human health?
Ease of administration: Is the tax easy to administer and 
enforce? Is it easy for taxpayers to comply with the tax? Is it 
easy to evade?
$107 billion in 1996, one-third of the region’s economic 
output. National governments received 62 percent of the 
total revenue collected in the Northwest, most of it from 
personal income taxes, with corporate income taxes and 
payroll taxes making up almost all the remainder. States 
and provinces collected about one-quarter, most of it from 
income and sales taxes. Localities collected the remain-
ing 15 percent, mostly from property taxes. Northwest 
jurisdictions generate revenue differently: Oregon and 
Montana leave sales untaxed, for example, while Washing-
ton and Alaska do not tax personal income (see Appendix 
for details). But these differences are overwhelmed by the 
similarities: all governments in the Northwest fund them-
selves by taxing beneﬁcial activities (“goods”) rather than 
harmful ones (“bads”).13
The incessant complexiﬁcation of tax policy, mostly 
driven by legislators placating special interests, has yielded 
a body of law that is virtually impenetrable—literally, a tax 
code. The original text of U.S. income tax law was 14 pages 
long. Its current incarnation, the Internal Revenue Code, is 
7.5 million words long and takes up six inches of shelf space. 
The regulations that interpret it take up another foot.14
Canada’s tax code is no less gargantuan, and subsidiary 
governments—states and provinces especially, but also coun-
ties, cities, school districts, port districts, utility districts, and 
others—pile on taxes of their own. British Columbia alone 
has 543 separate units of local government; Washington has 
1,709. A collection of all the Northwest’s tax rules would 
ﬁll a small library.15
Aside from the tax collectors themselves, few people 
actually understand tax law. Half a million accountants and 
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Personal Income Taxes
U.S. and Canadian federal governments depend on personal 
income taxes for almost half their revenue. B.C., Idaho, and 
Oregon also depend heavily on them. Washington and Alaska 
have no personal income tax. (For details, see Appendix.)
Economy: Income taxes are a heavy drag on the economy. 
Each dollar collected by national government results in a 
deadweight loss of about 31 cents; state and provincial taxes 
cause larger losses.19
Equity: Income taxes are among the most progressive taxes, 
despite countless exemptions that erode fairness. A ﬂaw, 
though, is that income taxes focus on cash ﬂow—what is 
earned yearly—rather than wealth, which determines ability 
to pay.
Environment: Income taxes fall heavily on paychecks, dis-
couraging people from working and increasing the true cost 
of labor to businesses. Firms therefore focus on conserving 
labor rather than on conserving resources. Furthermore, 
numerous loopholes reduce the tax burden on income from 
nonlabor sources in general, such as investments, and from a 
variety of environmentally destructive activities in particular.
Ease of administration: Complying takes Americans 5 billion 
hours each year. For every dollar raised, U.S. taxpayers spend 
nine cents obeying the law. Cheating is widespread: roughly 
one-ﬁfth of income goes unreported.20
Our grade: D Your grade: ________
lawyers are kept busy just interpreting U.S. tax policy for the 
public; most of us have only a tentative grasp on the subject. 
Perhaps consequently, political debate focuses almost entirely 
on how much to tax, rather than on what to tax.16
A History of Accidents
The major features of the apparatus that gathers govern-
ment revenue are relics of earlier tax reforms. In 1910, most 
national revenue collected in the Paciﬁc Northwest came 
from tariffs—customs duties—while most revenue collected 
by states, provinces, and localities came from property taxes 
and public sales of natural resources. By 1940, everything 
had changed. Most national revenue came from taxes on 
personal income and corporate proﬁt, and most state and 
provincial income came from taxes on income, proﬁt, and 
sales.17 Lesson 1. Nothing about taxes is preordained.
The national personal income taxes in both Canada and 
the United States trace their origins to farmers’ opposition 
to high tariffs. Indeed, when the Populist Movement of the 
late nineteenth century won passage of a federal income 
tax in the United States in 1894, the tax was designed 
to replace regressive tariff revenue. The Supreme Court 
promptly ruled the tax unconstitutional, but by 1909—with 
the Populists largely vanquished—the movement’s favored 
tax had become a mainstream idea. Democrats in Congress, 
allied with a few farm state Republicans such as William 
Borah of Idaho, proposed a federal income tax anew. An 
epic political battle with the White House ensued, and 
when the dust cleared, the nation found itself with a tax 
no one had previously asked for—the corporate income 
tax—but no personal income tax.18
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Payroll Taxes
Payroll taxes generate 
36 percent of federal 
revenue in the United States and 15 percent 
in Canada. U.S. payroll taxes for Social Security, Medicare, and 
unemployment insurance come to more than 15 percent of 
pay. Canada’s payroll taxes for unemployment insurance and 
the Canada Pension Plan are almost as high and set to rise 
higher. Both countries are preparing for the baby boomers’ 
retirement by collecting more payroll tax than they need now. 
Canada invests the surplus. The United States lends the surplus 
to the Treasury at low interest rates, then spends it on the 
general functions of government.24
Economy: Payroll taxes have deadweight losses of about 26 
cents per dollar of revenue and hit small businesses hard.25
Equity: Payroll taxes are extremely regressive. They are actu-
ally graduated in reverse, since they are collected only on the 
ﬁrst $65,400 of pay in the United States and approximately 
the ﬁrst Can$35,000 in Canada. Some 70 percent of American 
families pay more payroll than income tax, and payroll taxes 
alone push 1 million American children below the poverty line. 
Though the tax is ostensibly taken in almost equal parts from 
employers and employees, much of the employers’ portion 
actually falls on employees in the form of lower wages.26
Environment: Payroll taxes raise the price of labor relative 
to resources, encouraging labor conservation rather than re-
source conservation.
Efﬁciency: Payroll taxes are fairly easy to administer.
Our grade: F Your grade: ________
Only four years later, after state legislatures had ratiﬁed 
an amendment to the constitution, did the personal in-
come tax come into being. Apparently, the states ratiﬁed 
the constitutional amendment because legislators thought 
the tax would fall mostly on capitalists in a few eastern 
cities. Oregon and Washington ratiﬁed it with virtually 
no dissent; in Washington, the amendment’s passage went 
almost unmentioned in the local press.21
Considering what the personal and corporate income 
taxes would later become, they had modest beginnings. The 
personal income tax passed as a brief amendment to an act 
reforming tariffs. Indeed, the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
it created was so named to distinguish income taxes from 
the larger sums of “external revenues”—tariffs. At ﬁrst, 
both new taxes were minor obligations, paid only by a few, 
but they grew fast. By 1920, income taxes dominated the 
nation’s revenue stream, though they still touched relatively 
few northwesterners. Scarcely 10 percent of residents of  
Washington State ﬁled personal returns that year. Congress 
expanded the tax explosively during World War II; the 
number of ﬁlers soared from 4 million in 1939 to 43 mil-
lion in 1945.22 Lesson 2. Think big, start small.
North of the forty-ninth parallel, events followed a simi-
lar course. Canadian ﬁnance ministers have long written 
their proposals with U.S. tax laws close at hand because 
Canada competes with its larger neighbor for immigrants 
and capital. Thus, Canadian leaders had always spoken in 
adamant opposition to taxing personal income before the 
United States began doing so in 1913. But in 1917, con-
fronted with the rising cost of World War I, Canada enacted 
an income tax much like America’s.23
TAX SHIFT20 21 HOW WE GOT IT
Property Taxes
The property tax, the foundation of local govern-
ment ﬁnance throughout the Paciﬁc Northwest, garners 
about one-quarter of state and local revenue in most North-
west states but less in British Columbia (see Appendix). The 
impacts of the property tax are split and contradictory be-
cause it functions as two different taxes: one on capital (such 
as buildings and machinery) and one on a natural resource 
(land). (For details, see “Sprawl Taxes.”)
Economy: A tax on buildings engenders deadweight losses of 
roughly 24 cents per dollar collected. A tax on the value of 
land, because it is a tax on windfall proﬁts, carries no dead-
weight losses and may even help the economy.29
Equity: A land-value tax is progressive: the wealthy own 
most land. A building tax is regressive: richer homeowners 
spend proportionately less on buildings than poorer home-
owners, and building owners pass some of the tax on to ten-
ants.30
Environment: A building tax encourages dispersed develop-
ment and low-rise, car-dependent sprawl. A land-value tax 
encourages compact development, preserving open space.31
Ease of administration: Property taxes are immune to 
cheating, but administration is relatively expensive. The build-
ing tax is administratively more expensive than the land-
value tax.32
Our grade: C (land-value, A; building, F) Your grade: _______
The Canadian ﬁnance minister announced the tax a 
day after his government announced plans to draft 100,000 
men for service in the war, and the country accepted it as 
a matching “conscription of wealth.” The personal income 
tax affected scarcely 1 percent of the population at ﬁrst, but 
it later grew. In the meantime, the government introduced a 
corporate income tax and a manufacturer’s sales tax, which, 
in the late 1980s, turned into a value-added tax called the 
goods and services tax. So it was that between 1910 and 
1920, both the United States and Canada enacted all but 
one of their major modern taxes. (The lone exception is 
the payroll tax, which began with the U.S. Social Security 
Act of 1935 and a similar law in Canada in 1941.)27
At lower levels of government, the modern tax system 
was born mostly in the early 1930s, when many states re-
duced taxes on property by imposing taxes on personal and 
business income and on retail sales. For decades, Northwest 
states had relied on property levies for most revenues. (The 
province of British Columbia, a frequent exception, gen-
erated more money from public sales of natural resources 
than from the property tax until the 1920s.) In those days, 
property taxation was, in principle, wealth taxation. Lev-
ies applied to everything you owned, including not only 
real estate but also personal valuables such as jewelry and 
intangible assets such as cash, bank deposits, and stocks.28
In practice, however, the general property tax was a 
real estate tax. Tax agents lacked the power, now granted to 
income tax administrators, to require ﬁnancial disclosures, 
so they could enforce the tax only on readily inspected 
assets such as real estate. This administrative failure meant 
that real estate owners, and especially farmers, paid far 
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Sales Taxes
Sales tax rates range 
from zero in Oregon 
and Montana to 7 percent or more in 
Washington, California, and British Columbia (see 
Appendix). British Columbians also pay a federal goods and 
services tax, a value-added tax on each stage in the chain of 
production, which raises the effective sales tax rate to about 
14 percent. Washington is the most reliant on the sales tax, 
depending on it for one-third of state and local revenue.
Economy: Deadweight losses come to 23 cents per dollar col-
lected.35
Equity: Sales taxes exclude things that richer people buy 
disproportionately, such as private education, travel, second 
homes, land, and better medical care. The poorest ﬁfth of 
households in Idaho and Washington pay three times as much 
of their income in sales taxes as do the richest ﬁfth. 36
Environment: Many goods with large environmental im-
pacts—including electricity, heating fuel, gasoline, minerals, 
natural gas, pesticides, timber, and water—are exempt from 
sales tax in some or all of the Northwest.37
Ease of administration: Sales taxes are relatively simple to 
collect, except from mail-order sales.
Our grade: F Your grade: ________
a retail sales tax and a “business and occupations tax” on 
businesses’ gross receipts—effectively a sales tax paid by the 
seller rather than the buyer. The sales and business taxes, 
more than their share. Uneven enforcement also ruined 
public conﬁdence in the tax; it was regarded as a sham. 
Lesson 3. Easily evaded taxes lose the public trust. In 
the 1920s, farmers began agitating for relief, offering the 
state income tax as a cure for the shortcomings of general 
property assessments.33
In Oregon, farmers and their trade union allies pushed 
an income tax through the legislature in 1923, but a 
citizen initiative repealed the act months later. Four times 
thereafter, voters rejected the income tax before the farm-
dominated legislature readopted it explicitly to reduce state 
property taxes. Opponents again forced a referendum, but 
the Great Depression had begun, and surging ranks of the 
urban unemployed rallied behind the new tax on high in-
comes. Lesson 4. Keep trying. Oregon expanded its state 
income tax during the Depression, using it to completely 
offset funds from the old state property tax. Accustomed 
to the income tax, Oregonians have ﬁercely resisted the 
sales tax, voting against it six times.34
In Washington, similar dynamics were in play, but—in a 
classic example of the accidents that drive tax history—they 
had the opposite results. The state legislature approved 
an income tax in 1931, but the governor vetoed it. The 
powerful farmers’ Grange responded with an income tax 
initiative that prevailed two to one at the polls. When the 
state Supreme Court ruled the income tax unconstitutional, 
the Grange put a constitutional amendment before the vot-
ers. But the political moment had passed. A state property 
tax cap had won approval in the meantime, splintering 
the income tax coalition, and the amendment went down 
in ﬂames. Shortly afterward, the state legislature adopted 
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Corporate Income Taxes
At the national level, only personal income and payroll 
taxes generate more revenue than corporate income taxes. 
Northwest states and provinces all depend on business taxes 
for about 8 percent of revenue. Instead of levying the usual 
corporate income tax, Washington taxes businesses’ gross 
receipts.41
Economy: Corporate taxes discourage investment, penalize 
proﬁt-making businesses, and badly distort business deci-
sions. Deadweight losses from national corporate taxes alone 
are about 37 cents per dollar of revenue.42
Equity: Business taxes are superﬁcially progressive, since rich 
individuals own most corporations. But because the taxes 
discourage enterprise, much of the cost is ultimately borne 
by workers, in the form of lost jobs and wages. Replacing 
corporate taxes with higher personal taxes for the wealthy 
would be better. Washington’s tax falls heavily on start-up 
companies and others with small proﬁt margins.43
Environment: Special tax rules favor mining, logging, and 
other high-impact activities. Washington’s tax rate for ser-
vice industries is three times the rate for manufacturers. 44
Ease of administration: Most of the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Code is devoted to arcane rules about corporate accounting. 
This complexity raises compliance and enforcement costs.45
 Our grade: F Your grade: ________
despite their heavy burden on those with low incomes and 
small proﬁt margins, solved government’s ﬁscal woes. The 
system was no longer broken, so few saw reason to ﬁx it. 
Like Oregon in reverse, Washington grew accustomed to 
its taxes and rejected the income tax seven times.38
In California, too, Depression-era revulsion with 
property taxes led to a ﬂurry of citizen tax initiatives. In 
1933, the legislature put its own proposal on the ballot, 
and voters decisively approved it. Called Riley-Stewart, the 
measure blew up California’s existing tax regime and left 
the legislature to create a new one. Sacramento immediately 
adopted a retail sales tax, followed two years later by a state 
income tax. By 1935, the bulwarks of California’s modern 
tax system were in place.39
In Idaho, meanwhile, Governor C. Ben Ross, a con-
servative but populist Democrat, won legislative approval 
of the state personal and corporate income taxes long sup-
ported by farmers. In 1935, fearing the loss of federal relief 
funds unless the state raised matching funds, Ross called a 
special session of the legislature to institute a retail sales tax. 
The levy—quickly dubbed “a penny for Benny”—did not 
survive a subsequent referendum, but the state reenacted 
it in 1965 to eliminate state property taxes.40
The Northwest jurisdictions that did not construct their 
modern tax regimes between 1910 and 1940 are British 
Columbia and Alaska. B.C. created its income tax in 1876. 
By 1910, when most places were just beginning to think 
about modern taxes, B.C. also had a corporate income tax, a 
variety of taxes on land and resources, and the usual general 
property tax. (The provincial sales tax came later, in 1948.) 
Alaska began to rely overwhelmingly on taxes and royalties 
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ness interests and property owners—have spread through 
the region in a wave of copycat lawmaking.47 Lesson 6. 
Political movements make all the difference.
Like the tax revolts of the Great Depression, the more 
recent ones have centered on the property tax, probably 
because self-interested property owners form a huge vot-
ing bloc. California’s Proposition 13 in 1978—imitated the 
same year in Idaho—reduced property taxes in the state by 
about $7 billion and locked in the reductions. If you owned 
a median-priced house, Proposition 13 was an opportunity 
to step inside the voting booth and write yourself a check 
for $870. (Interestingly, Proposition 13 won despite the 
overwhelming loss of three similar initiatives in the previ-
ous decade.) The following year, Washington voters capped 
the growth rate of their state government.48
Then, in the 1990s, Oregon voters twice capped or 
cut property taxes, doling out billions of dollars in tax 
savings to property owners as they approved measures 
that had lost at the polls as many as ﬁve times over previ-
ous decades. In 1993, Washington voters tightened the 
cap on the growth rate of state spending and also tied 
the legislature’s hands by requiring that two-thirds of the 
members of both houses approve any tax increase or shift. 
A tax measure in Oregon had a similar effect, demand-
ing supermajorities in the legislature and public votes 
for local tax and fee increases. As a result, Oregon voters 
ﬁnd themselves studying mundane ballot proposals such 
as the 1997 measure to increase dog license fees by $2. 
In California, Proposition 13 and subsequent initiatives 
have also made voters, rather than legislators, the arbiters 
of many tax reform proposals.49
from the oil industry with the opening of the trans-Alaska 
pipeline in 1977 and abolished its personal income tax 
three years later. One thing B.C. and Alaska did the same as 
other Northwest jurisdictions was to adopt taxes on motor 
fuels, cigarettes, and liquor in the 1920s and 1930s. Oregon 
invented the gas tax in 1919 and was quickly copied by 
its neighbors; most “sin” taxes began in the early 1930s.46 
Lesson 5. Governments copy one another.
Roll On, Complexity, Roll On
Drafted in the three decades before 1940, the list of taxes 
that revenue ofﬁcers collect has since stayed remarkably 
stable. The rates have varied: national income tax rates 
have declined since World War II, while sales and payroll 
taxes have climbed substantially. But the tax burden has 
not shifted back onto property or trade. It has remained 
on income, proﬁts, paychecks, and sales.
As important as changing rates has been the relentless 
accretion of special exceptions, especially in recent decades. 
Washington, for example, has enacted 222 of its 378 special 
tax giveaways since 1970. Oregon has enacted most of its 
288 tax breaks in the past three decades. In both states, the 
value of tax exemptions actually exceeds the value of taxes 
collected; striking all exemptions would allow tax rates 
to be cut roughly in half. Instead, the piecemeal removal 
of more and more things from the base of each tax has 
pushed tax rates up. And rising rates have mobilized new 
interest groups to demand tax breaks of their own. This 
vicious circle of narrowing bases and rising rates added 
force, ultimately, to the tax revolts of the past two decades. 
These revolts—the fruits of years of organizing by busi-
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steadily increased taxes on health-threatening goods such 
as cigarettes and alcohol, earmarking some of the funds for 
medical care and health promotion. Lesson 7. The current 
trend is toward ﬂat taxes, consumption taxes, and “sin” 
taxes. Environmental taxes are all three.
Many jurisdictions have also enacted small environ-
mental fees, increased their reliance on user fees—such as 
infrastructure charges on developers and pay-by-the-bag 
trash collection charges—or trimmed subsidies for de-
structive activities. A green tax shift would build on this 
emerging trend. Your tax bill would reﬂect what you took 
from nature.
Flat-Tax Society
If the tax reforms of the early twentieth century shifted 
taxes off property and onto income, the trend of the late 
twentieth century has been to shift the burden from prop-
erty and income onto payroll and sales. The tax burden 
has therefore moved from the rich onto the middle class 
and poor. In Washington, D.C., ﬂat personal income taxes 
and national sales taxes are being seriously debated. At the 
state and provincial level, this trend is perhaps most visible 
in every jurisdiction’s increased reliance on lotteries and 
other forms of gambling—revenue sources that are, though 
voluntary, nonetheless strongly regressive.50
No state in the Northwest has a tax system that is 
progressive or even truly ﬂat, collecting an equal share of 
income from all classes. Worst of the bunch is Washington, 
which has the most regressive tax system in North America. 
The poorest 20 percent of  Washington households spend 
three times as much of their income on state and local 
taxes as do the richest 20 percent. The middle 60 percent 
pay almost twice as large a share of their income as do the 
rich (see Figure 1).51
Some proposals for national tax reform center on tax-
ing personal consumption rather than personal income. 
Taxing consumption is the right idea, but these proposals 
train their sights on the wrong kind of consumption. They 
would tax consumption as deﬁned by orthodox economists: 
the sale of any good or service. What they ought to tax 
is consumption as deﬁned by environmental economists: 
degrading the gifts of nature.
Still, recent developments in tax policy provide some 
hope for an environmental tax shift. Most jurisdictions have 
Figure 1. Who Pays What? State and Local Taxes, 1995
The poor pay a larger share of their income in taxes than the 
middle class—and the middle class pay more than the rich—in 
every Northwest state.

























B.C. Idaho Ore. Wash.
Household income Can$55,000 $40,500 $46,200 $49,600
State, provincial, and local taxes
Sales and excise taxes 957     1,701 323    3,770
Property taxes 1,380 729 1,594 1,389
Income taxes 4,086 1,256 2,379 0
Federal taxes
Payroll taxes 2,920 3,098 3,534 3,794
Income taxes         6,508 3,851 4,706 5,216
Value-added tax (GST)         1,135           0    0 0
Total           Can$16,986 $10,635 $12,537 $14,169
The Joneses’ Taxes
Sources: see note 53.
Taxes?! I Hate Taxes!
As they sit around the picnic table at 
their family reunion, the Joneses let off steam 
about their income and property taxes. If 
they had an accurate breakdown of their 
annual tax burden (see below), they would probably pay more 
attention to their sales and payroll taxes.
Even this tabulation is not complete, because it doesn’t in-
clude hidden taxes that the Joneses pay indirectly. The Joneses’ 
payroll tax burdens, for example, effectively double because 
of the matching payroll taxes their employers pay. These and 
other business taxes that lower the Joneses’ wages and limit 
their job opportunities escape notice even more than the sales 
and payroll taxes they pay directly.
Idaho Jones downs his Budweiser—the bestselling beer in 
America—and fumes over his property taxes. Little does he 
know that taxes made up about 43 percent of what he paid 
for the can in his hand.52
Taxes could reinforce—rather than contradict—ourshared beliefs in the importance of individual freedom 
matched with individual responsibility, of work and per-
sonal initiative, and of fairness. They could strengthen our 
economy and improve our environment. And they could 
do so equitably and with greater ease of administration 
than the existing system. In short, we can get taxes off our 
backs and onto our side.
Furthermore, we could design a tax shift that matched 
revenue sources with the appropriate level of government. 
That way, local problems such as trafﬁc jams would be an-
swered with local taxes; state and provincial problems such 
as air pollution would be addressed with state and provincial 
taxes; and global problems such as climate change would 
be remedied with national taxes.
Carbon Taxes
Slowing global climate change is among the largest envi-
ronmental challenges facing the world, and it is dispropor-
tionately a North American problem. North Americans 
emit more than twice the quantity of climate-threatening 
greenhouse gases per person as do Western Europeans, 
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the typical working household $852 a year. A tax of this 
magnitude would add eight cents to the price of a gallon 
of gasoline (Can$0.03 per liter), increase the wholesale 
price of natural gas by 14 percent, and raise the price of 
coal by 49 percent. It would also reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Although we would pay more for gasoline and 
heating, the lower payroll taxes would leave most working 
northwesterners with more money in their pockets.57
Shifting from payroll taxes to carbon taxes would re-
duce the regressivity of the tax system, with one notable 
exception. Low-income retirees and other nonworking 
poor households do not pay payroll taxes, but they would 
pay carbon taxes. Partial rebates or other means of com-
pensating these households would address this hardship.
The service sector would beneﬁt greatly from this tax 
shift. The biggest losers would be the Northwest’s handful 
of coal-burning power plants and ten aluminum smelters, 
which together account for one-tenth of the region’s green-
house gas emissions. Some plants might close; others would 
convert to cleaner fuels or more-efﬁcient industrial pro-
cesses. Displaced workers might need transitional aid, but a 
gradual tax shift would allow the economy to absorb them. 
And the pain of carbon taxes would be nothing compared 
with the pain of full-ﬂedged climate change.58
Ideally, climate protection taxes would be national levies 
paired with matching carbon tariffs on imports, to prevent 
an inﬂux of foreign goods manufactured in polluting plants. 
But states and provinces could encourage national action 
with starter taxes at modest rates. In the Northwest, state 
and provincial taxes of just $10 per ton of carbon dioxide 
would have yielded $578 million in 1994.59
roughly four times the global average. The consequences 
of climate change are likely to be severe in the Northwest, 
including worsened ﬂoods, droughts, and forest ﬁres.54
One good way to reduce North American emissions 
is to impose a carbon tax—a tax on fuels in proportion to 
the carbon dioxide they emit—and parallel taxes on other 
greenhouse gases. These taxes would raise the prices of 
gasoline, electricity from coal, and other goods with big 
climate impacts. But the rise would be gradual and predict-
able, allowing everyone from homeowners to major cor-
porations to adapt. People would switch to more efﬁcient 
vehicles, equipment, and appliances and do more errands 
on foot, on bike, and on-line. More passengers and freight 
would move by rail rather than by air. More home buyers 
would ask about energy bills, consider energy-saving apart-
ments and condominiums, and look for residences closer 
to work. In billions of individual choices, the interests of 
the climate would become a consideration, not through 
conscious do-goodery but through the persuasiveness of 
the price tag.55
Revenues from carbon taxes could ﬁnance reductions 
in payroll taxes. Shifting from regressive, antilabor payroll 
taxes to carbon taxes would be a mild tonic for employment 
growth and a strong tonic for wage growth. It would pro-
vide for seniors’ retirement while safeguarding the climate 
in which they will retire.56
A tax of $100 per ton of carbon dioxide, with parallel 
rates on other greenhouse gases, would have raised $5.8 
billion in the Northwest in 1994, assuming a 15 percent 
reduction in emissions. It would offset more than one-
fourth of all payroll taxes collected in the region and save 
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54 percent from 1950 to 1994; rates have also increased 
in Canada, but somewhat more slowly. In both countries, 
the prevalence of breast and prostate cancers, already high, 
is growing fast. Childhood cancer, once a rarity, has also 
become all too common: if present trends continue, one of 
every 400 American children born this year will contract leu-
kemia, brain cancer, or some other cancer before his or her 
ﬁfteenth birthday. Surging cancer rates cannot be explained 
entirely by aging of the population, changes in smoking rates, 
hereditary factors, or better detection techniques.63
Suspicions about the role played by the vast quantities 
of toxic chemicals in our air, food, and water are difﬁcult 
to prove. Cancer may result from the cumulative effects of 
multiple exposures to various combinations of the 75,000 
or so synthetic compounds in wide commercial use. Five to 
10 percent are estimated to cause cancer, but fewer than 3 
percent have been deﬁnitively tested one way or the other. 
Nonetheless, researchers have shown that cancer death rates 
are higher in U.S. counties with hazardous waste incinera-
tors and other major environmental contaminants and that 
exposure to solvents and pesticides at home or at work can 
endanger not only adults but their children as well. Other 
studies have revealed or suggested links between “hormone 
mimics”—chemicals that our bodies mistake for human sex 
hormones such as estrogen—and breast and prostate cancers 
and other reproductive system maladies.64
North American environmental protection agencies 
have banned some of the worst human-made chemicals, 
but their overarching failure to protect public health is 
unsurprising given the Herculean scope of their task and 
the limitations of regulations. Regulations must, by their 
Pollution Taxes
Not counting greenhouse gases, more than 3.5 billion 
pounds of harmful pollutants ﬂow into the Northwest’s 
environment each year. Though simply adding up tons of 
different pollutants is a bit like adding apples and oranges, 
the sheer volume of it all is staggering. No less thought-
provoking is the total of overtly dangerous substances: 
more than 4 million pounds of toxic materials entombed 
in landﬁlls; 39 million pounds dumped into rivers and lakes; 
and 63 million pounds dispersing, like a puff of smoke, into 
the air we breathe.60
Even seemingly harmless pollutants can have sobering 
consequences. The primary cause of poor water quality 
in Washington and Idaho is not the discharge of toxins 
from manufacturing plants but the runoff of manure and 
other fertilizers from farms. Small particles suspended in 
the air—by-products of burning wood, coal, and motor 
fuels—pose grave dangers to our lungs.61
Other threats arise from the 250 or so human-made 
chemicals that reside in the fatty tissues of almost every 
living person in North America. This chemical contamina-
tion is a prime suspect in the rising rates of reproductive 
disorders, including life-threatening tubal pregnancies and 
endometriosis, an often painful, fertility-impairing condi-
tion that afﬂicts about 5.5 million North American women. 
Among males, average sperm counts have fallen 50 percent 
since World War II.62
Cancer is also increasingly common. It now strikes more 
than one in three and kills about one in four North Ameri-
cans; men are at greater risk than women, and Americans 
are at greater risk than Canadians. U.S. cancer rates climbed 
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Point sources The most obvious targets of pollution taxes 
are factories, sewage treatment plants, and other facilities 
where pollutants come out of pipes or smokestacks. Pollu-
tion taxes in use in North America and around the world 
highlight their ability to provide cost-effective pollution 
control. In the Netherlands, a hefty charge for dumping 
lead, mercury, and other heavy metals into rivers is the main 
reason that water pollution levels dropped more than 90 
percent between 1975 and 1995. As part of the phaseout 
of ozone-depleting chloroﬂuorocarbons (CFCs) in the 
early 1990s, the U.S. government imposed taxes that raised 
CFC prices as much as 11-fold, spurring innovations that 
quickly produced low-cost alternatives. Tradable emissions 
permits, which are related to taxes, have helped the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) control the sulfur 
dioxide emissions contributing to acid rain. Germany and 
France have made headway with water pollution charges, 
as have Wisconsin and New Jersey.66
Current environmental regulations provide ready-made 
tools for taxing point sources. Managers of point sources 
must already monitor and report their emissions of many 
pollutants, and most governments in the Northwest already 
levy small fees based on these reports. Pollution taxes could 
use this administrative framework to generate revenue 
without new bureaucracy.67
Pollution taxes consist of two components: a relative 
tax rate, which weighs the dangers of different chemicals 
against one another, and a baseline rate, which applies to the 
“average” chemical. For example, if the baseline rate were 
$2 per pound and arsenic were ranked as 50 times more 
dangerous than average, then the tax rate for arsenic would 
very nature, take a continuum of risk and divide it in two: 
allowed (i.e., “safe”) and not allowed (i.e., “unsafe”). Nine 
parts per million of the insecticide malathion on a Wash-
ington apple is considered an unacceptable risk to public 
health, but eight parts per million is considered harmless. 
Because regulations allow for no middle ground, a host of 
factors—including the entrenchment of chemicals in our 
economy, well-ﬁnanced political opposition, and scientiﬁc 
uncertainties—have all but forced regulators to err not on 
the side of caution but on the side of the status quo, giv-
ing the green light to a vast assortment of questionable 
chemicals and activities. And because regulations cannot 
acknowledge the existence of a continuum of risk, they are 
unable to provide incentives for manufacturers and others 
to explore or invest in safer alternatives.65
Regulations are the best way to control the most 
dangerous chemicals, but taxes can help address the vast 
gray areas along the continuum of risk. Taxes can take into 
account what we know about different chemicals—their 
toxicity and persistence, for example—with higher tax rates 
for more dangerous substances. Just as important, taxes 
can take into account what we don’t know about differ-
ent chemicals. Scientiﬁc suspicion that a certain chemical 
contributes to cancer, for instance, might not be enough 
to justify banning that chemical, but it could easily justify 
an increased tax rate. The tax could even incorporate a 
“surcharge on uncertainty” that would rise over time, giv-
ing companies an ever-stronger incentive to conduct safety 
tests or switch to previously tested materials. Pollution taxes 
would smooth a transition out of our current dependence 
on tens of thousands of risky substances.
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be $100 per pound. Setting relative rates is an imperfect 
science, but existing air and water quality standards, together 
with point-source emissions limits, provide an introduc-
tory system that’s in place now for weighing the impact 
of different pollutants. In Wisconsin, for example, severe 
limitations on discharge levels identify the most dangerous 
water pollutants, which are taxed at higher rates than pol-
lutants with fewer discharge restrictions. Modiﬁcations to 
such off-the-shelf systems can accommodate special needs 
in different localities.70
The ideal tax rate, according to economists, charges 
polluters for the costs they impose on others. These “exter-
nal” costs include environmental damage, health impacts, 
and economic losses. Finding this optimal tax rate is easier 
said than done, but scholarly estimates of the human and 
environmental costs of pollution suggest that the optimal 
rates are many times higher than the fees in place now. 
The fee for emitting a ton of sulfur dioxide, for instance, 
is about $50 in most regions of the Northwest, but the 
costs of that pollution—including crop losses, building and 
monument corrosion, impaired visibility, and respiratory 
illnesses—may be $5,000 or more. Gradually increasing 
pollution taxes until they approximate the true costs of 
polluting would add economic teeth to the regulatory 
approach of pollution control agencies. Had they been in 
place in 1995, pollution taxes would have raised $3.1 bil-
lion in the Northwest, assuming a 15 percent reduction in 
emissions. (See Appendix for detailed pollution tax rates 
and revenues.)71
Shifting current business taxes (mostly corporate in-
come taxes) onto pollution would not greatly affect the 
Permit Me to Pollute
If pollution can be taxed like cigarettes or 
any other commodity, what makes it differ-
ent from any other commodity? Well, noth-
ing, really—a point made explicit in tradable 
permit systems such as the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency’s ﬁve-year-old sulfur dioxide (SO2) program. 
Every year, EPA issues a limited number of “permits to pollute,” 
each of which gives its owner the right to emit one ton of SO2. 
Companies can then buy or sell these permits like so many 
shares of stock or sacks of potatoes. By reducing the number of 
permits issued each year, EPA will reduce SO2 emissions in the 
year 2000 to half their 1980 levels.68
Tradable permit systems are more complicated than pol-
lution taxes, in part because governments must hold an an-
nual auction to generate revenue from permits. Pollution 
permits and taxes are closely related, however, in that both 
use economic tools to make polluting expensive. The details 
of reducing pollution are left to the invisible hand of the free 
market. Economic incentives aim to achieve low-cost pollution 
reduction and to stimulate innovation by giving businesses 
and inventors an opportunity to make a proﬁt (or cut costs) by 
reducing pollution. The SO2 permit program is a case in point: 
entrepreneurial and technological advances have cut the cost 
of reducing SO2 emissions from $660 per ton in 1992 to about 
$100 in 1997.69
Despite its successes, the commodiﬁcation of pollution has 
troubled some observers, who question the morality of buying 
and selling the right to pollute. Still, the alternative to selling 
permission to pollute is, in practice, to give away such permis-
sion for free, a policy unlikely to reduce emissions and more 
likely to increase costs for all involved.
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kill more than 19 people each year, would have to clean 
up their act. So would coal and metal mines, which rival 
pulp and paper mills as polluters. And pollution taxes would 
not pass over huge chicken-, hog-, and cattle-raising “fac-
tory farms,” which environmental agencies consider point 
sources of pollution.74
Even though pollution charges could be increased 
gradually to give companies time to adopt new technolo-
gies and production processes, hefty pollution taxes none-
theless seem to pose a threat to the viability of manufactur-
ing businesses, especially if foreign competitors do not face 
similar standards. Yet research by Harvard Business School 
professor Michael Porter reveals that pollution taxes and 
other environmental protection measures have the same 
effect as the emergence of rival ﬁrms: existing businesses 
may not like them, but the innovations they inspire create 
stronger, more competitive companies. Indeed, numerous 
case studies involving ﬁrms such as Boeing, Ford, and the 
Canadian telecommunications company Nortel highlight 
environmentally inspired changes in production processes 
that resulted in less pollution, higher-quality products, lower 
costs, and greater employment.75
Pollution taxes would encourage manufacturers to stop 
investing in—and dumping—vast quantities of chemicals 
and to start investing in the people and innovations that 
offer low-cost pollution solutions. And should these solu-
tions prove too costly, companies would end up paying 
the pollution tax and raising the prices of their products. 
A properly designed pollution tax would therefore make 
prices tell the truth about the environmental damage done 
during manufacturing.
overall level of business taxes in the Northwest, but the tax 
rates for speciﬁc companies and industries might change 
substantially. With big polluters bearing more of the tax 
burden, small entrepreneurs—the source of two out of 
every three new jobs in America—would get a break. The 
growing service industry and other “clean” sectors would 
also beneﬁt handsomely. And increased demand for pol-
lution reduction programs would further strengthen the 
Northwest’s green technology sector.72
While “clean” companies would beneﬁt, “dirty” com-
panies would pay for the messes they make. One analysis of 
the impact of water pollution charges in Washington State 
found that more than half the taxes would be levied against 
polluters in one industry: pulp and paper manufacturing. 
It’s easy to see why: inventories of major toxic polluters in 
Oregon and Washington read like a Who’s Who of the pulp 
and paper industry. And while British Columbia’s govern-
ment was the ﬁrst in the world to establish a deadline—the 
year 2002—for the elimination of dioxins and other deadly 
by-products of chlorine bleaching, its counterparts in the 
United States have dragged their feet, despite a call by the 
nation’s largest public health association for a phaseout of 
industrial chlorine use.73
Other major polluters would also be held responsible 
for their wastes. Sewer systems would be improved in mu-
nicipalities like Vancouver, B.C.—where the Annacis Island 
plant regularly shows up on B.C.’s list of the province’s 
worst polluters—and Seattle, where 2.2 billion gallons of 
raw sewage was dumped into the waters of Puget Sound 
in 1996. Coal-burning power plants, like the one in Cen-
tralia, Washington, whose sulfur emissions are estimated to 
TAX SHIFT42 43 WHAT WE COULD HAVE
farmers’ use of pesticides roughly matched that in Oregon 
or Montana—reduced pesticide use by almost 50 percent 
between 1985 and 1990. Using tax revenue to fund research 
and education programs can help farmers adjust and bring 
substantial additional reductions in pesticide use.79
Fertilizer taxes can be easily piggybacked on existing 
programs in which Northwest governments partly ﬁnance 
fertilizer inspection programs by imposing a tax of a few 
pennies per ton. Pesticides would be more difﬁcult to tax, 
in part because only California carefully tracks their sale or 
use. Like a tax on industrial emissions, pesticide taxes could 
use a ranking system—such as the one developed by the 
Environmental Health Policy Program at the University of 
California, Berkeley—to differentiate between compounds, 
imposing the highest taxes on compounds that pose the 
greatest danger to people and the environment. Hefty tax 
rates might be needed to achieve signiﬁcant reductions in 
chemical use, but even moderate tax rates would stimulate 
farmers, researchers, and governments to devote more at-
tention to low-chemical cultivation.80
Fertilizers and pesticides each make up about 4 percent 
of farm production costs, so even doubling their prices 
would raise farm costs by at most 8 percent. But farmers 
would likely discover ample opportunities to trim chemical 
use, softening the tax blow. In the Netherlands, which pro-
vides about 65 percent of the world’s exported cut ﬂowers, 
actions taken to reduce environmental harms have lowered 
costs and improved product quality. Cornell professor David 
Pimentel argues that pesticide use on major Northwest 
crops such as apples and potatoes could be reduced by 50 
percent with little or no increased cost to the farmer and 
Farming: Beside the point? Although factories and 
other point sources are still a huge environmental problem, 
small or scattered nonpoint sources, most notably mo-
tor vehicles and farms, have steadily gained in notoriety. 
Fertilizer runoff—which stimulates algal blooms, depletes 
oxygen, and threatens ﬁsh populations—damages tens of 
thousands of miles of rivers and streams in the Northwest, 
including one-third of those in Washington State. By the 
1980s, pesticides had contaminated groundwater supplies 
in about one-fourth of counties in the American part of 
the Northwest. With agricultural chemical use and cancer 
deaths linked in nearly 1,500 rural U.S. counties, pesticide 
trade names like Revenge, Max-Kill, and Hel-Fire take on 
new meaning.76
To crop producers, agricultural chemicals have major 
beneﬁts: a dollar invested in pesticides, for example, returns 
about $4 in crops saved. But that dollar also results in at least 
$2 in off-the-books damage to the environment.77
Regulations have for the most part failed to deal with 
these dangers. Controls on fertilizers are so minimal that 
some U.S. fertilizer manufacturers legally mix hazardous 
wastes into their products. Pesticide regulation has an 
equally dismal record. A 1993 study by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences concluded that, despite 30 years of effort 
by EPA to evaluate pesticide safety, lack of information 
made it impossible to determine if pesticide regulations 
adequately protected children. Other studies suggest that 
pesticide regulations leave farmworkers at much greater 
risk of occupational injury and illness than others.78
Where regulations fail, taxes can succeed. Thanks in 
part to a 30 percent sales tax on pesticides, Sweden—where 
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that a 50 percent reduction in pesticide use in the United 
States as a whole could be achieved with only a 1.5 percent 
increase in consumer prices.84
A pesticide tax averaging $8 per pound, roughly double 
the current average cost of pesticides, would account for 
the $2 in external costs that arise from each $1 spent on 
pesticides. The costs of fertilizer use are difﬁcult to quantify, 
but a tax of $75 per ton would tack roughly 50 percent 
onto the price of fertilizers. Together, these taxes would 
have generated $700 million annually in recent years, as-
suming a 15 percent reduction in use.85
Such a tax shift would bring tremendous beneﬁts to the 
Northwest. Consumers would have fewer worries about 
pesticides at the dinner table. Retail food prices would 
increase only slightly, if at all. Less chemical runoff would 
greatly improve water quality for drinking, recreation, and 
wildlife. The greatest beneﬁciaries of such taxes, though, 
might be agricultural communities in the Northwest, espe-
cially if the revenue were used to offset current taxes that 
damage farm economies. Higher chemical prices would 
make knowledge-intensive farms more competitive relative 
to chemical-intensive farms, encouraging farmers to adopt 
low-chemical alternatives like integrated pest management. 
Farm jobs would be safer, and wider use of techniques such 
as scouting and forecasting could raise employment levels. 
As chemical use declined, dollars previously captured by 
the agrochemical industry would recirculate within rural 
communities, boosting the economy. And taxes on agri-
cultural chemicals would reverse the perverse incentives 
that lead farmers to poison themselves, their families, and 
their surroundings in order to survive.
Tax Evader #1: Farms
Farms are among the worst offend-
ers in water pollution, toxic chemi-
cal use, and habitat destruction, 
but they get special favors under existing 
tax laws. In Washington, for example, farmers and food proces-
sors got $268 million in sales and business tax breaks in 1997, 
including sales tax exemptions on fertilizers and pesticides.81
Property tax breaks are also huge: $122 million a year in 
Oregon and Washington. Those handouts stem from the belief 
that agriculture is dominated by family farmers who, in the 
face of soaring property tax bills, would have no choice but to 
sell to developers. To prevent this scenario, Northwest govern-
ments tax farmlands at their “current use” value—the value 
of farmland as farmland rather than as a potential housing 
development—which gives farmers tax discounts of up to 95 
percent. Yet most farms are not threatened by urbanization at 
all: some 84 percent of Oregon farmland assessed at use value 
is in eastern Oregon, far from large cities. And farmers who 
do face pressure can trim their taxes with conservation ease-
ments. For most landowners, though, the joys of farming do 
not hold a candle to the big money offered by developers. The 
research literature on farm taxation is unequivocal: use-value 
assessment does not slow sprawl.82
A tragic irony of use-value assessment is that “hobby farm-
ers” seeking tax breaks have swept into farmlands. Thousands 
of suburban dwellers in Ada County, Idaho, plant alfalfa to 
reap property tax deductions of up to 95 percent. In the Fraser 
River valley around Vancouver, B.C., hobby farms, golf courses, 
and developers have taken over much land supposedly re-
served for agriculture.83
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Driving: A particular problem Just as damages from 
nonpoint sources of water pollution have surpassed those 
from point sources, the harms from nonpoint sources of 
air pollution—such as woodstoves, solvent use, and motor 
vehicles—are outpacing those from smokestacks. The most 
serious threats to air quality in the Northwest are tiny 
inhalable particles (also called ﬁne particulate matter) that 
can worsen respiratory diseases, especially for children and 
the elderly. Researchers in Seattle estimate that inhalable 
particles are responsible for 12 percent of emergency room 
visits for asthma. In addition to missed days of school and 
work, inhalable particles can result in hospitalization and 
even death. Analysis of two long-term studies by Harvard 
Medical School and the American Cancer Society suggests 
that particulate pollution kills more than 1,800 northwest-
erners each year.86
The main sources of the most dangerous inhalable 
particles (those smaller than 2.5 microns in diameter, about 
28 times thinner than a human hair) are not natural sources 
like windblown dust but human activities. Particulate pol-
lution results directly from fuel combustion in woodstoves, 
coal power plants, and motor vehicles, and indirectly from 
atmospheric reactions involving other dangerous air pol-
lutants such as ozone and sulfuric acid. The worst polluters 
are the 11 million cars, trucks, and buses that crowd our 
roadways and garages. Collectively, they are responsible for 
about half the air pollution emissions in the Northwest’s 
major metropolitan areas.87
The most commonly discussed market-based solution 
to our car troubles is the gas tax, either by itself or as part 
of a carbon tax intended to combat global warming. But 
Tax Evader #2:  
The Car
Existing tax laws give cars the 
green light at every turn. In Brit-
ish Columbia and Washington, the tax breaks start 
before cars even roll out of the dealership: buyers can subtract 
the value of any used car they trade in from the price of the 
new car they are buying before calculating sales tax. This 
handout cost Washington governments $120 million in 1997.88
B.C., Idaho, and Washington exempt motor fuels from 
retail sales taxes; in Washington, this giveaway was worth 
$214 million in 1997. They and other Northwest jurisdictions 
impose gas taxes but earmark the proceeds for roadwork, so 
governments’ general funds do not beneﬁt. Even in Alaska 
and British Columbia, the only parts of the Northwest that do 
not earmark gas tax receipts, road spending usually exceeds 
fuel tax revenue. California applies both fuel taxes and sales 
taxes to gasoline but still earmarks the entire revenue stream 
for roadwork. Local jurisdictions in Washington, Oregon, and 
Idaho, meanwhile, spent almost $500 million from property 
and other general taxes on roadwork in 1993. As a result, the 
true tax rate on gasoline—factoring in roadwork subsidies—is 
negative.89
Finally, parking—whose provision costs substantially more 
than the fuel northwesterners put in their tanks—gets off 
lightly under existing tax codes. Most parking in the North-
west is given away for free and is untaxed. The U.S. fed-
eral income tax exempts the value of employee parking, a 
$3-billion-a-year handout nationwide. Canada in effect does 
the same thing. In both countries, subsidies to drivers who are 
afﬂuent are larger than to transit riders who are poor.90
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minute, when the engine is too cold for the pollution-
cutting catalytic converter to work properly. These “cold 
start” emissions would diminish if trips were combined or 
eliminated; land-value taxes (discussed later in this chapter) 
could help by encouraging more compact development. 
Additional gains in air quality could come from reducing 
trafﬁc congestion, since stop-and-go driving generates 
emissions three to four times higher than normal.94
Another option is to promote cleaner fuels, which 
are held back by seemingly insigniﬁcant price differences. 
Reformulated (or oxygenated) gasoline cuts emissions by 
15 percent but is hard to ﬁnd in the Northwest because 
it costs ﬁve cents more per gallon than regular gasoline. 
California’s tough standards for diesel fuel, which reduce 
emissions of inhalable particles by up to 25 percent, raise 
diesel prices by only about six cents per gallon—also not 
much, but enough to effectively banish “California diesel” 
from most of the Northwest. Governments can make clean 
fuels competitive by shifting the burden of fuel taxes from 
clean fuels to dirty ones. Tacking a ﬁve- or ten-cent sur-
charge onto the most polluting fuels and giving a similar 
discount to the cleanest fuels would promote cleaner fuels 
without affecting the majority of gasoline purchases.95
Even greater gains, in both the short and the long term, 
could come from cleaning up cars. Some 20 percent of the 
vehicles currently on the road are responsible for as much 
as 80 percent of automobile emissions. Simply repairing or 
replacing these superpolluters—mostly old or malfunction-
ing vehicles—would cut on-road emissions by about three-
quarters. One possibility is to exempt the best-performing 
20 percent of vehicles from existing annual license and reg-
while emissions of carbon dioxide are proportional to the 
amount of fuel a vehicle consumes, emissions of urban air 
pollutants depend heavily on other factors such as the age 
and condition of the vehicle and the type of fuel used. As 
a result, increasing gas taxes is not the only—or even the 
best—way to improve urban air quality.91
A superior strategy would be to charge drivers for the 
estimated costs of their vehicles’ emissions. During the 
regular emissions inspections that already take place in all 
of the Northwest’s major metropolitan areas, each vehicle’s 
per-mile emissions would be measured, and odometer 
readings would reveal the number of miles driven that year. 
Multiplying the two ﬁgures yields an estimate of the car’s 
yearly emissions, for which the driver would have to pay 
according to the same tax rates that apply to point sources. 
Such a tax—averaging $135 per car—would generate $1.5 
billion in revenue (assuming a 15 percent reduction in 
emissions) and give a powerful boost to the development 
and use of cleaner vehicles.92
Mileage-based emissions fees would be especially help-
ful for diesel-powered vehicles, which can emit 30 to 100 
times more inhalable particles than comparable gasoline-
powered ones. Phased in slowly, such a policy would be 
the best tool for improving air quality. But several ﬁrst steps 
could set the stage. Higher gas taxes or per-mile insurance 
charges could lessen gasoline consumption. (See NEW’s 
The Car and the City for more ways to reduce our driving.) 
Other tax shifts could improve air quality by changing our 
driving habits and our choices of cars and fuels.93
For instance, over 80 percent of the pollution from 
a typical ﬁve-mile urban drive comes during the ﬁrst 
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some of the business’s own emissions and thus reduce its 
tax bill. Some regions in California run similar “cash for 
clunkers” programs.98
Trafﬁc Taxes
Survey after survey ﬁnds that people consider trafﬁc con-
gestion the worst problem in the metropolitan Northwest. 
Hardly surprising. Seattle has the sixth-worst gridlock in 
the United States, and Portland, at fourteenth worst, is not 
much better. Congestion in these two metropolitan areas 
wastes 130 million hours of residents’ time and 143 million 
gallons of gasoline each year. The situation in Vancouver, 
B.C., is also dismal.99
Motorists enraged at government ineptness, population 
growth, or one another may ﬁnd small comfort in the axiom 
of transportation planning ﬁrst enunciated by economist 
Anthony Downs in 1962: trafﬁc volumes will inevitably 
overwhelm urban freeways during peak hours. Congestion 
happens, Downs warned, adding that it would be futile to 
convert our cities into “giant cement slabs.”100
Thirty-ﬁve years later, many northwesterners still in-
stinctively cling to the idea of expanding our 220,000-mile 
highway network. But this supply-side strategy is ﬁnally 
losing its sheen. Overshadowing air quality concerns and 
neighborhood opposition is ﬁscal necessity. In a time of 
constrained budgets, citizens and elected ofﬁcials are hesi-
tant to spend billions for more pavement. In Portland, a 
gas tax increase of $1.25 per gallon would be needed to 
fund the estimated 60 miles’ worth of new highway lanes 
required each year to mount a serious assault on congestion. 
With bridge expenses driving road-building costs above 
istration fees and double the fee on the worst-performing 20 
percent of vehicles. Such a “20/20” tax shift, while leaving 
the middle 60 percent of vehicles completely unaffected, 
would give a few drivers an annual bonus for investing in 
clean vehicles and other drivers a pricey reminder that their 
wheels are behind the times. This type of policy would be 
easy to implement in localities throughout the Northwest 
that already require emissions tests.96
A longer-term strategy to encourage the development 
and purchase of cleaner vehicles would be to change the 
tax rates on new cars. Again, a “20/20” program, with the 
worst-performing new cars paying all or some of the taxes 
for the best-performing ones, would reap tremendous 
beneﬁts without affecting the majority of new car buyers. 
California’s legislature passed a similar proposal in 1989, 
but the governor vetoed it. Even a tax shift of $100 per car 
might work wonders: that sum represents the price differ-
ence between a standard vehicle and a low-emission vehicle 
that pollutes only 30 percent as much. The importance of 
a seemingly trivial few hundred dollars was highlighted in 
early 1998 when Chrysler’s president hesitated to adopt 
design changes that would reduce pollution from sport util-
ity vehicles by 40 percent, because such changes would add 
$200 to its Jeep Grand Cherokee’s $30,000 sticker price.97
A ﬁnal option is to involve businesses in the search 
for low-cost pollution reduction strategies. Once point-
source pollution taxes are in place, hard-hit businesses could 
qualify for tax credits by ﬁxing or buying out superpol-
luters, installing vapor recovery systems in gas stations, or 
taking other measures to improve urban air quality. Each 
ton of emissions such a program eliminated would offset 
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In this extended-rush-hour gridlock, commuters will 
ﬁnd themselves vying for space with parents driving their 
kids to school, retirees on social outings, and teenagers on 
shopping trips. By giving everybody equal and unlimited 
access to a valuable commodity, government policy has 
created inefﬁciencies that rival the breadlines of communist 
Russia. Those breadlines hint at a solution—quite possibly 
the only solution—to trafﬁc jams: charging for the use of 
busy roads. Providing a scarce resource for free, be it a loaf 
of bread or highway space at rush hour, inevitably leads to 
gridlock. Seven years after the fall of the Soviet Union, it 
may be time for North America to give the free market 
a road test.
The Northwest could attack congestion and revenue 
needs simultaneously by imposing tolls (to be collected at 
full speed using “smart cards” and modern electronics) on 
busy roadways during busy hours; the toll would rise as 
rush hours approach and taper off as trafﬁc dwindles. Such 
a system, known as congestion pricing, has the potential to 
transform northwesterners’ transportation decisions. Some 
travelers—truckers, for example—will pay the fee and reap 
the beneﬁts of less congested roads. Some will take the bus 
or join a carpool. Others will minimize their costs by adopt-
ing innovations like telecommuting or “casual carpooling.” 
Still others will decide to postpone their trip to the mall 
until rush hour is over or to walk to a neighborhood store 
instead. Everyone using the roadway will have an incen-
tive to economize his or her use of a valuable resource, 
and everyone—on the road and off—will beneﬁt from the 
hundreds of millions of dollars in tax breaks funded by 
toll revenue.104
$10 million per mile, planners in Seattle and Vancouver, 
B.C., face similar ﬁnancial constraints.101
As road building’s stranglehold on the Northwest’s 
transportation imagination loosens, citizens and their elected 
ofﬁcials are shifting their focus from increasing the supply of 
asphalt to reducing the demand for it. Under the rubric of  
“transportation demand management,” ofﬁcials are looking 
at everything from promoting and enhancing transit service, 
bicycling, carpooling, and telecommuting to limiting park-
ing, raising gas prices, and turning freeways into tollways. 
Having thrown our pocketbooks at the problem for 30 years, 
we are now throwing the kitchen sink as well.
Unfortunately, we are moving too slowly, and not 
always in the right direction. Present transportation plans 
will continue to make heavy demands on the public purse 
over the next 20 years. In Seattle and Portland, the costs of 
the planners’ preferred systems exceed anticipated revenues 
by billion of dollars and, if fully funded, would still hardly 
dent the gridlock that awaits us down the road.102
Even if the Seattle area digs up almost $1 billion extra 
each year to spend on mass transit and other transportation 
improvements, afternoon gridlock will spread to almost half 
the freeway network in the central Puget Sound region by 
the year 2020. The time residents spend stuck in trafﬁc will 
grow threefold over 1995 levels; average highway speeds 
will fall to 21 miles per hour. Ditto for Portland: even if 
voters approve an extra $4.7 billion in road-building proj-
ects, drivers inside the urban growth boundary can expect 
to spend twice as much time in trafﬁc jams by 2015. Ditto 
again for Vancouver, B.C., where rush hours will tie up 60 
percent more vehicles in 2021 than in 1992.103
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As congestion pricing becomes more familiar both in the 
Northwest and elsewhere, drivers may calm their fears and 
hesitantly embrace the advantages of toll roads.106
Two concerns are that tolls would slow trafﬁc and in-
trude on drivers’ privacy. Fortunately, “phantom tollbooth” 
technology would allow drivers to pay tolls without slow-
ing down and without compromising their privacy. Instead 
of stopping at tollbooths, drivers would place prepaid toll 
cards—purchased at gas stations—in their windows. Scan-
ners along the roadway would deduct tolls as cars pass. 
The system would be completely anonymous as long as 
drivers possessed the toll cards; scofﬂaws, travelers, and 
others without toll cards would have their license plates 
photographed for later billing. Similar systems are already 
in place in southern California and around the world.107
Another concern is that tolls would impose a heavy 
burden on the poor. Studies suggesting that congestion 
pricing is likely to beneﬁt the rich more than the poor 
seem to conﬁrm the regressive nature of tolls. But there are 
three extenuating circumstances. First, using toll revenues 
to reduce bus fares or expand bus service would make 
congestion pricing substantially more progressive. Second, 
congestion pricing focuses both the costs and the beneﬁts 
of tolls on rush-hour commuters. The large beneﬁts for 
the wealthy come not just because they have no problem 
shelling out a few bucks to speed things along, but also 
because they tend to spend a lot of time on the road during 
peak hours. Lower-income individuals who would have 
more difﬁculty paying the tolls are less likely to be on the 
roads during peak hours and so are well situated to avoid 
paying the tolls at all. Third, worsening gridlock beneﬁts no 
The People’s Transit
Few activities bring out the ingenuity 
of North Americans like avoiding taxes. 
With congestion pricing, this inclination would be 
harnessed to reduce gridlock. Around San Fran-
cisco, tolls and gridlock have resulted in “casual carpooling,” 
in which drivers cruise by suburban transit stops and pick up 
commuters. Passengers save on bus fare and get a quick ride 
downtown. Drivers get to speed along in the carpool lanes and 
don’t have to pay tolls. Used daily by about 10,000 commuters 
in the Bay Area, casual carpools have also formed in Washing-
ton, D.C.105
Truly an organized coincidence, casual carpooling develops 
spontaneously. Its emergence and growth depend not on gov-
ernment policy but on favorable conditions, including tolls, 
carpool lanes, and other incentives for would-be drivers to 
leave their cars at home and for will-be drivers to pick them 
up. A reliable transit service is also vital, both as a backup and 
to provide easily identiﬁable pickup locations.
As congestion worsens and budgets tighten, more 
areas are examining congestion pricing. Vancouver, B.C.’s 
transportation plans assume that the city will stem the ﬂood 
of cars into downtown by imposing $2 tolls on Burrard 
Peninsula bridges; Portland is considering implementing 
a congestion-pricing pilot program. It may not be long 
before the Northwest takes a hint from Orange County in 
southern California, where drivers have to pay to use the 
express lanes that a private company added to Route 91. 
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The current trend toward devolution—handing pow-
ers and duties down to lower levels of government—could 
bring us back to our senses. Higher government levels could 
get out of the transportation business entirely by handing 
over control of gas taxes and gas tax revenues, along with 
responsibility for maintaining and expanding road and tran-
sit systems, to city and county authorities. As metropolitan 
residents, businesses, and governments realize that they are 
on their own—that help is not on the way—they will face 
their steadily worsening gridlock with enhanced interest 
in low-cost transportation solutions.
With or without devolution, congestion pricing is 
bound to get attention. Opponents are sure to resist, for 
free ways die hard. But governments can take baby steps 
without provoking drivers’ ire by sponsoring demonstration 
projects, such as the one under consideration in Portland. 
And, should congestion pricing remain beyond the pale, 
voters and their elected ofﬁcials will have only two choices: 
they can do nothing and watch the problem get much 
worse, or they can spend a lot of money and watch the 
problem get much worse.
Sprawl Taxes
The mirror image of suburban sprawl is urban decay: 
boarded-up buildings, vacant lots, and derelict neighbor-
hoods. In every Northwest city, there is ample room for 
development around urban centers, in close-in neighbor-
hoods, and in underused commercial and industrial zones. 
And ﬁlling in our cities is the only way to avoid ﬁlling up 
our countryside. It is also the only way to create cities in 
which automobiles are not king. Most Northwest jurisdic-
one. Lost time, wasted gas, and higher transportation costs 
harm everyone, both rich and poor. The rich may beneﬁt 
the most from congestion pricing, but almost everyone 
will end up with more time on their hands, more money 
in their pockets, or both.108
Analysis of the Seattle area highlights the crucial role 
that congestion pricing is likely to play in any viable trans-
portation solution. If nothing is done to solve the region’s 
transportation problems, planners at the Puget Sound Re-
gional Council (PSRC) predict that afternoon commuters 
in the year 2020 will waste over four times as many hours 
in trafﬁc backups as they did in 1995. Implementing con-
gestion pricing plus a kitchen sink of other tactics would 
result in what PSRC calls the “optimum performance 
strategy”: 2020 afternoon commute delays only 26 percent 
above 1995 levels. Congestion pricing is the linchpin of 
this strategy. Without it, the “kitchen sink” scenario by itself 
will lead to a 3.4-fold increase in afternoon delays—and 
$21 billion in unpaid transportation bills.109
Nonetheless, PSRC decided only to continue study-
ing congestion pricing. The obstacle was not technical but 
political. In an age of resentment over government intrusion 
and waste, proposals to tax roads are unpopular.
Ironically, this resentment of big government may in 
the end speed the adoption of tolls. The big-government 
programs that built our national highway systems are coun-
terproductive now that our biggest transportation problem 
is congestion. Matching funds from higher levels of gov-
ernment reward suburbs with disastrous land-use planning, 
distract local decision makers from low-cost alternatives, 
and expend vast sums to brieﬂy delay gridlock.
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tions seek to prevent sprawl through the regulatory tools of 
land-use planning; none applies taxes to the same task. Yet 
a simple reform to the existing property tax would turn it 
into a powerful incentive for investment in city and town 
centers and in adjacent neighborhoods.
A property tax is actually two conﬂicting taxes rolled 
into one. It is a tax on the value of buildings and a tax on 
the value of the land under those buildings. As experience 
in Australia, New Zealand, Taiwan, and Pennsylvania shows, 
shifting the tax from the former to the latter aids compact 
development while suppressing land speculation, promot-
ing productive investment, and tempering housing costs, 
especially for the poor. It does these things because of the 
unique nature of land values.110
In land values, location counts for everything. Land in a 
crime-infested, rundown neighborhood is worth a fraction 
as much as an identical lot in a safe, popular neighborhood. 
Paradoxically, though property owners can increase their 
building values by improving their buildings, nothing they 
do to the property will change their land values. Only their 
neighbors, government, and society at large can do that. 
Government actions are especially important, and they usu-
ally increase land values. If a city builds a park, a province 
expands transportation infrastructure, or a nation restores 
a historic landmark near a parcel, the land’s value will rise. 
Government-caused reductions of land values are called 
“takings,” but “givings” through acts like these are in fact 
more common.111
Location matters a great deal to people. In King County, 
Washington, which includes Seattle, the assessed value of 
real property was $107 billion in 1993. Of that, only $61 
Tax Evader #3: 
Mansions
Big houses are a big environ-
mental issue. As much as 40 
percent of the raw materials consumed in North America go 
into constructing, maintaining, and heating buildings. Tax 
policy encourages us to live in big houses on big lots—speed-
ing sprawl—and to invest in second homes, which are often 
built on fragile slopes and shorelines.112
Federal income tax deductions for mortgage interest, 
property taxes, and homeowners’ capital gains (earnings 
from rising land values) totaled $80 billion nationwide in the 
United States in 1997, and nearly half the beneﬁt went to 
households with annual incomes above $100,000. The U.S. 
government gives more housing assistance to families with 
six-ﬁgure incomes than to the poor.113
State income taxes, most of which are coupled to the fed-
eral tax, increase the value and inequality of these handouts. 
Oregon lost $383 million to homeowner tax breaks in 1996. 
They cost Montana $50 million in 1997, of which 84 percent 
went to the richest 30 percent of households.114
Canada’s tax breaks for housing are smaller and better 
focused. Neither mortgage interest nor property taxes are 
deductible, although capital gains are lightly taxed. Ho-
meowners do get an income tax credit for property taxes 
paid, but the credit helps mostly the poor and middle class. 
As a result, about the same proportion of Canadians own 
their homes as Americans, but Canadians live in smaller 
residences.115
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Take a tour of any Northwest city, and, if you look for 
them, you will notice that a surprising share of private lots 
hold rundown buildings or no buildings at all. In Seattle, 
such a tour could begin immediately across the street 
from the city’s venerable Pike Place Market, where—on 
land worth more than $100 per square foot—almost an 
entire block is full of parking lots and derelict buildings. 
One houses a strip joint. One, an eight-story building, has 
been vacant above the second ﬂoor since 1975. Much of 
the block is part of the empire assembled by land specula-
tor Sam Israel, who accumulated 40 parcels in downtown 
Seattle and dozens of others elsewhere. After Israel’s death 
in 1994, the Seattle Times noted, “He owned more property 
in downtown Seattle—and had done less with it—than any 
other private landowner in the city.”119
Typical buildings on fully used downtown lots are 
worth three to four times as much as the land under them. 
Israel’s decrepit downtown buildings, taken together, were 
worth half as much as the land under them. Holding his 
5.4 acres of prime urban sites out of full development 
meant pushing thousands of ofﬁces, apartments, and shops 
out of the urban core. And Israel, whose properties are at 
last being developed by his successors, was unusual only 
in the scale of his business and in its eventual exposure to 
public scrutiny. A study of eight randomly selected urban 
and suburban neighborhoods in King County found that 
between 8 and 63 percent of land is vacant or dramati-
cally underdeveloped. In the city of Seattle, land zoned for 
residential development could hold an additional 113,000 
units of housing. All development in fast-growing Clark 
County, Washington—a suburb of Portland—would ﬁt easily 
billion represented the value of private buildings—approxi-
mately what it would cost to reconstruct them. The remain-
ing $46 billion came from the value of land—what people 
would be willing to pay purely for location. In Vancouver, 
B.C., the assessed value of land in 1994 was Can$51 billion, 
while buildings were worth Can$19 billion.116
And location matters more as time goes by. As incomes 
rise, people spend an increasing share of their earnings on 
location. Historically, urban land values have increased faster 
than population, the consumer price index, or income. 
The real value of private land in King County multiplied 
ninefold from 1976 to 1995. In economic terms, rising 
wealth is capitalized in land values; in common parlance, 
to quote comedian Will Rogers, “Buy land, because they 
ain’t makin’ any more of it.” In the 1990s, prices for homes 
in all the Northwest’s major cities have skyrocketed, climb-
ing 9 percent annually in King County and even faster in 
metropolitan Portland. The run-up in housing prices is 
due to fast-growing populations with fast-rising wealth 
competing for the same parcels of urban space.117
Because land is a rare commodity whose worth in-
creases through actions of everyone except the owner, land 
speculation is possible. Most successful investments, whether 
in businesses or buildings, create salable products not oth-
erwise available. The investor makes money, and consumers 
have more of what they want. But successful land specula-
tion—buying land to hold it until its value increases—fails 
the public. It does not create any salable good or service; it 
prevents full use of premium sites, shunting development 
to less desirable locations. The investor makes money, and 
society has less of what its members want.118
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ums—and by about 5 percent for single-family residences. 
In King County, taxes would rise slightly for single-family 
homeowners in the most central neighborhoods, encourag-
ing creation of accessory, or “mother-in-law,” apartments; 
in Clark County, industrial facilities would save more than 
one-third of their tax bills.122
In both counties, these changes are averages that mask 
wide ranges of outcomes. Under land-value taxation, the 
tax burden shifts in proportion to the intensity of land 
use on each property; it makes no difference whether that 
parcel is urban or suburban, expensive or cheap, commer-
cial or residential. The question is whether the site is used 
to its potential. If it is, the tax burden will decrease; if it is 
not, the tax burden will increase. (Indeed, one weakness 
of land-value taxes is that they encourage development 
not only in urban areas but also along fragile shorelines 
and other popular scenic areas. Land-value taxes are good 
at containing sprawl; other policies are needed to protect 
ecologically important areas.)
Finally, shifting the property tax onto land is highly 
progressive because land ownership is concentrated in 
the hands of the afﬂuent. Indeed, the distribution of land 
ownership is much more skewed than the distribution of 
income. Those who own no land beneﬁt enormously, and 
even most middle-class homeowners beneﬁt, because their 
houses are usually worth more than their land.123
Exempting all buildings, equipment, and other capital 
from the property tax, and making up the lost revenue 
through higher rates on land values, would yield the same 
revenues for localities, states, and provinces in the Paciﬁc 
Northwest as they currently garner from property taxes—
into two-thirds the land area if developers ﬁlled contigu-
ous sites before leapfrogging to remote ones. And building 
compact, walkable neighborhoods rather than sprawling 
subdivisions would shrink the footprint of development 
in the county to one-third its actual size.120
Land speculation is parasitic, not productive. Its an-
tidote is to shift the property tax off buildings and onto 
land. Exempting buildings from the property tax and shift-
ing its full burden onto land values would have put Sam 
Israel out of business—or into the business of developing 
premium sites rather than hoarding them. It would have 
boosted his Seattle tax bill by $200,000 a year, eliminating 
almost all the proﬁts he might have hoped for from land-
value appreciation. To pay the tax, he would have had to 
generate more income by developing or selling some of 
his parcels.121
Shifting property taxes from buildings onto land in-
creases development of the most valuable sites, especially 
in city centers, but also in suburban centers and other 
already developed areas. Parking lots—a standard holding 
pattern for land speculators—give way to buildings. Density 
increases. Supplies of apartment and ofﬁce space increase. 
Rental prices moderate.
Modeling results for King and Clark Counties, Wash-
ington, show that land-value taxation would more than 
double taxes on parking lots and vacant building lots, 
increase taxes by up to one-quarter on car-oriented com-
mercial strip development, and moderately reduce taxes on 
pedestrian-oriented neighborhood shopping districts. It 
would reduce taxes by about one-third on the most land-
efﬁcient forms of housing—apartments and condomini-
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Raising land-value taxes still higher—to collect more 
revenue than current property taxes generate—would nei-
ther impose deadweight losses on the economy nor penal-
ize the poor. And it would only increase the tax’s beneﬁts 
against sprawl and sky-high housing prices. In this book, 
though, we are arguing only for a shift of the property 
tax onto land values. If funds were ever needed to cover 
revenue shortfalls, land-value taxes offer a better recourse 
than conventional taxes on income and capital.
Resource Consumption Taxes
The environmental impacts of the human economy are 
especially pronounced at the economy’s feeding end—the 
industries that extract energy, timber, water, and other 
natural resources. Lump these industries together and you 
have the league leaders in habitat destruction and species 
endangerment. You also have the providers of raw materials 
that pass through the human economy, where the indus-
tries that process, transform, transport, and dispose of them 
generate another large share of environmental harm. Tax-
ing extraction tells everyone to conserve natural resources, 
encouraging recycling, efﬁciency, and frugality from the 
sawmill to the shopping mall to the garbage dump.125
States and provinces can levy taxes to reﬂect environ-
mental harm; they can also tax resource rents—windfall 
proﬁts from resource extraction. These latter taxes offer 
no immediate environmental beneﬁt because they do not 
change prices, but they are strongly progressive and could 
generate hundreds of millions of dollars in additional funds 
without causing deadweight losses. Besides, capturing 
windfalls often requires no new tax; instead, it requires 
You Must Pay the Rent
The concept of economic rent is central to 
understanding land-value and resource 
taxation. Rent is windfall proﬁt, proﬁt 
that accrues to a company not as a 
result of its skill and hard work, but be-
cause it succeeds in gaining private control of a public good 
of exceptional value. Urban land values are a clear example of 
economic rents: they reveal the worth of a location, not the 
worth of what a landowner has built at that location. Normal 
proﬁts beneﬁt society by attracting competitors to a market, 
ultimately lowering prices for consumers and reducing proﬁts 
for producers. Where proﬁts result from economic rents, how-
ever, competitors cannot enter the market because the owner 
has locked up the resource. Taxing away windfalls from own-
ing prime urban real estate, therefore, does not raise the price 
of urban sites; it only reduces the proﬁts.124
Windfalls sometimes also accrue to owners of mineral 
rights, timber concessions, commercial ﬁshing permits, water 
rights, and dam licenses. Taxing away these rents does not 
affect prices either; it yields public revenue without any dead-
weight losses. But because rent taxes leave prices unchanged, 
they do not usually encourage resource conservation. Land-
value taxes succeed in that goal only because they prevent 
land speculation.
some $11 billion in 1996. But it would turbocharge existing 
growth management plans, encouraging full development 
in urban and suburban centers, along with more compact 
development elsewhere in cities.
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diverted in the Northwest. Phasing in the tax over a decade 
would soften the blow, allowing farmers to improve their 
equipment and adjust their cropping patterns. Administering 
the tax would be simple. Much water delivered to farms 
is already measured; where it is not, monitoring is neither 
difﬁcult nor expensive. Alternatively, states could tax irri-
gators’ water rights, which would encourage them to shed 
unneeded rights and speed the water-rights adjudication 
proceedings grinding on in many Northwest basins.129
A tax of six cents per 1,000 gallons would have only a 
slight effect on food prices. In California, even if the entire 
tax were passed on to consumers, it would raise the price 
of a hamburger with all the ﬁxings by about four cents, the 
price of a pound of ﬂour by two cents, and the price of a 
pound of fresh tomatoes by less than one-ﬁfth of a cent. It 
would add ﬁve one-hundredths of a cent to the price of 
an order of french fries from Idaho. In an age of surging 
populations and endangered salmon, a gallon of water is 
surely worth at least six one-thousandths of a cent.130
Hydropower What water remains in Northwest rivers 
ﬂows through dozens of large hydroelectric dams—dams 
that generate power at a price about 40 percent lower than 
the continental average. But just as fossil fuels’ environmen-
tal impacts go unmentioned in market prices, hydropower 
actually costs more than its price. To reﬂect the cost of 
decimated salmon runs and other consequences, state and 
provincial governments could, as Idaho does, tax hydro-
power and use the proceeds to offset other taxes. A one-half 
cent per kilowatt-hour environmental tax on hydropower 
would have generated $1.1 billion in 1996.131
charging market rates for public resources. The public, after 
all, owns most timber stands and mineral deposits in the 
Paciﬁc Northwest—which is 75 percent public land—along 
with all wild ﬁsh, hydropower sites, and fresh water. Yet 
governments give away many of these resources for free 
or sell them at ﬁre-sale prices.126
Existing taxes on resource rents and resource consump-
tion—on ﬁsh, fossil fuels, hydropower, minerals, timber, and 
water—generated $2.3 billion in 1996 in the Northwest. 
Some $1.8 billion of that total accrued to British Columbia, 
where resource taxes and royalties account for 13 percent 
of local and provincial revenue.127
Water Taxing diversions of water from lakes and rivers, 
and its extraction from underground aquifers, would stem 
the enormous inefﬁciency in water use in the Northwest, 
safeguard ﬁsh and aquatic habitats, and increase hydropower 
production by leaving more water in streams. Among 
Northwest jurisdictions, only B.C. charges fees for with-
drawing water from the public realm, and it charges as little 
as one-sixth of a cent per thousand gallons. (Elsewhere, 
people pay for water delivery, not for the water itself.) In 
the rest of the Northwest, a tax of $20 per acre-foot—$0.06 
per 1,000 gallons—would have generated more than $600 
million in 1995, assuming a 15 percent reduction in con-
sumption induced by higher water prices. In Idaho alone, 
which consumes more water per person than any country 
in the world, it would have yielded $288 million, offsetting 
half the state’s sales tax.128
A tax of that size would be too small to notice for anyone 
but irrigators, who use 81 percent of the water pumped or 
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major tax shift opportunity. At present, the choices about 
deregulation seem limited to bad (cheap power but no 
wild salmon) and worse (neither cheap power nor wild 
salmon). But there is a third, little-mentioned possibility: 
governments could embrace deregulation and—through 
taxes on private dams and treasury contributions from 
public dams—claim any windfall proﬁts that deregulation 
brought the region’s dam operators. A small share of the 
resulting revenues could pay for salmon protection and 
energy conservation programs, which utilities ﬁnd difﬁcult 
to support in a competitive market.
Turbines in Northwest dams produce one-third of 
North America’s hydropower, and the Northwest’s big dams 
are among the least expensive electricity generators in the 
nation, so in the end, the Northwest may come to use its 
power efﬁciently at home and sell the surplus. The proﬁts 
could help fund the region’s governments, much as taxes on 
windfalls from oil and gas extraction generate two-thirds of 
Alaska’s revenue. B.C.’s tax on windfall proﬁts from natural 
gas production demonstrates how a hydropower rent tax 
might work: the tax rate is minuscule when gas prices are 
low but rises in step with prices. For hydropower, such a 
price-dependent tax might ultimately result in revenues of 
one cent per kilowatt-hour, once deregulation is complete. 
Had deregulation and a hydropower windfalls tax been 
fully phased in by 1996, the tax would have generated $2.2 
billion for Northwest governments.134
Timber The price of timber does not include the envi-
ronmental costs of logging, such as lost wildlife habitat, 
erosion into mountain streams, and worsened ﬂoods from 
Tax Evader #4: 
Energy
Energy consumption is favored 
with plentiful tax exemptions. 
The federal governments of the United States and 
Canada go easy on the energy industry, mostly through spe-
cial accounting rules. In the United States, federal tax breaks 
of about $2 billion went to oil, coal, alcohol fuel, and other 
energy industries in 1997. Because most states and provinces 
base their income taxes on federal rules, they lose additional 
revenue to these provisions. Montana lost half a million dollars 
a year in 1992 and 1993.132
All Northwest state and provincial governments except 
Alaska exempt from the general sales tax not only motor fuels, 
but also electricity, natural gas, and some other fuels, though 
in B.C. the exemption applies only to residential consumers. 
A patchwork of other taxes, including utility receipts taxes 
and kilowatt-hour taxes, make up some of the difference, but 
these taxes are small and irregular. Idaho, for example, impos-
es a slim tax on electric power—but only if it is hydropower; 
only if it is generated in the state; and only if the consumer 
isn’t using it for irrigation, mining, minerals processing, or 
manufacturing.133
Meanwhile, another kind of tax on hydropower could 
turn the advancing deregulation of the North American 
electricity market—which threatens to spread low-cost 
Northwest power to other regions even while stranding 
Northwest ratepayers with old debts such as that from the 
Washington Public Power Supply System debacle—into a 
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tion of logging permits probably would have generated still 
more. The U.S. Forest Service, the region’s second-largest 
landowner, auctions off most of its timber concessions but 
accepts bids far below the full cost of building associated 
roads and selling the timber. In 1996, national forests in 
the Paciﬁc Northwest (including southeastern Alaska, 
logged-over watersheds. A tax of $20 per thousand board 
feet of timber, perhaps collected by the same administrators 
who gather existing timber taxes, would have generated 
$565 million in the Northwest in 1992 and tilted the wood 
products market toward recycled materials.135
Northwest governments could retroﬁt existing timber 
taxes into true environmental levies. Oregon could simply 
raise its tax of $4 per thousand board feet. British Columbia 
already imposes a tax on logging, but Ottawa effectively 
assumes this tax burden by counting every dollar a company 
puts toward the logging tax against the company’s federal 
income tax bill. Canada could end that exemption. All 
Northwest states and provinces but Oregon already collect 
modest timber harvest taxes in lieu of property taxes on 
standing private timber. (Oregon collects timber harvest 
taxes in lieu of property taxes on private timberland, not 
on the timber itself.) All the jurisdictions could separate the 
harvest tax from the property tax, making it clear that there 
is no tax on growing trees, only on cutting them down. 
They could also extend the harvest tax, as does Washington, 
to public as well as private timber.136
To capture windfalls from public timber, governments 
could sell permission to log public timber only when the 
sale is above cost and at market prices, and only when it 
passes environmental review. British Columbia, which 
owns more Northwest forest than anyone else, sold trees at 
a small fraction of their value until the early 1990s, when 
the province raised prices substantially, dedicating most of 
the proceeds to a new program of forest restoration and 
economic development in timber towns. The higher prices 
brought in an extra Can$452 million in 1996; an open auc-
Tax Evader #5: Timberlands
Private timberland owners, who hold 
the most productive wood-grow-
ing land in the region, enjoy 
many of the same property 
tax breaks as farmers, with 
the same unintended consequences. Montana taxes tim-
berland at one-sixth the average property tax rate in the state. 
Every other state and province in the Northwest taxes timber-
land, like farmland, at current-use values.137
Because lighter taxes apply to timberland than to natural 
forests—in British Columbia, the tax burden is reduced by half 
or more—the main physical impact of use-value taxation is 
to encourage logging on fragile land. The main ﬁscal impact 
is to reduce government revenue: $31 million a year lost in 
Oregon, $4 million a year in Washington, and millions more 
elsewhere.138
These regional handouts come on top of federal giveaways 
such as the bizarre accounting loophole called “expensing of 
timber-growing costs” that delivers $200 million nationwide 
annually to U.S. timber owners. States that piggyback their 
income taxes on the federal code lose millions more: $12 mil-
lion in Oregon, for example, and $3 million in Montana.139
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would roughly approximate environmental impacts, be-
cause an ore’s value determines how much land the miners 
can afford to disrupt in its pursuit. A 10 percent tax on 
virgin nonfuel minerals extracted in the Northwest states 
would have yielded $127 million in 1995.143
Other public assets that governments could tax without 
distorting the economy include the broadcast spectrum, 
whose use is distributed mostly by application rather than 
by auction, and airspace for landings and takeoffs from air-
ports. Air travel is polluting, noisy, and energy intensive.
northwestern California, and western Montana) lost $156 
million on timber sales.140
Fish Commercial ﬁshing in Washington and Oregon is 
almost defunct after a century of habitat destruction and 
overﬁshing, but to the north the industry remains stronger. 
Existing taxes on ﬁshing in the Northwest—commercial 
ﬁshing taxes, sport ﬁshing licenses, and commercial ﬁshing 
permits—help stem overﬁshing and also help pay for 
ﬁsheries programs. They yielded $156 million in 1996 in 
the Northwest, including Alaska. But they do not capture 
all the rent. If they did, ﬁshing licenses would not trade 
for exorbitant prices, as they do in northern British Co-
lumbia, where a commercial ﬁshing license can garner 
Can$120,000. Revising these taxes to capture resource 
windfalls might double the revenue.141
Minerals One of the most environmentally damaging 
industries, mining is a shadow of its former self in the 
Northwest. But since the 1980s, miners have learned to 
use solvents to extract metals from mountains of crushed 
rock, and proposals for new mines are sprouting up across 
the region’s map. Where these controversial projects can 
pass environmental review, states could tax them to capture 
windfalls, perhaps doubling revenue. (Only B.C. now gener-
ates more than token revenues from mines.) Reforming the 
1872 Mining Act could ensure that the U.S. government 
received the windfalls from mines on federal lands.142
Environmental taxes on virgin minerals would reﬂect 
environmental costs while encouraging conservation and 
recycling. Taxing minerals at a percentage of sale price 
What Environmental Taxes 
Cannot Do
Taxes are powerful tools, but there 
are many jobs they cannot do. The 
biggest limitation of tax mechanisms 
is that there must be something to tax. This simple fact can 
be problematic in cases where it’s impossible to measure the 
damage one wants to tax—for instance, soil erosion, over-
grazing, and other bad land-stewardship practices—or where 
measuring the problem is expensive or intrusive, such as pollu-
tion from woodstoves, lawn mowers, and barbecue grills. Taxes 
also cannot clean up existing messes, such as the Hanford 
Nuclear Reservation, the Superfund mining sites in the Rock-
ies, the salmon-killing design of many dams, or the half-mil-
lion miles of logging roads lacing Northwest forests. In these 
cases and others—such as protecting coasts and other scenic 
and important zones from development—regulations and 
other strategies are necessary.
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pollution and water use—would have yielded $24 billion. 
Existing fuel taxes, sin taxes, and other revenues that did 
not penalize work and investment actually generated $10 
billion. Thus, of a total of $40 billion of revenues collected 
that year, green taxes could have readily generated all but 
$6 billion (see Figure 2 and Appendix).
The tax package described in this book would produce 
different results in different parts of the region. In Brit-
ish Columbia, for example, had the tax shift been fully 
phased in by 1996, it (along with existing revenue sources 
that did not fall on labor or capital) would have generated 
82 percent of B.C.’s provincial and local revenue. In B.C., 
pollution and hydropower taxes would have yielded the 
most new revenue, aside from the reformed property tax 
on land values. Overall, such a tax shift would have elimi-
nated all property taxes on buildings (as everywhere in the 
region), plus almost all provincial corporate income, sales, 
and personal income taxes.
In Idaho, the same tax package would have supplied 85 
percent of the state’s revenue, offsetting three-fourths of all 
state corporate income, personal income, and retail sales tax-
es. Water-use taxes would have been the largest new source 
of revenue. This tax shift would have displaced 70 percent 
of Oregon’s taxes on labor and capital, allowing the state 
to eliminate corporate income taxes and exempt poor and 
middle-class households from personal income taxes. Pollu-
tion and hydropower taxes would have been the twin lead-
ers among new revenue sources. Washington’s hydropower 
taxes would have yielded the most new revenue in that state 
under a tax shift. Overall, the state would have bid farewell 
to two-thirds of its taxes on labor and capital. It could have 
Together, taxes on natural resource rents would power 
economic development by removing deadweight burdens 
from the economy, while taxes on resource consump-
tion would steer the economy toward conservation and 
efﬁciency. Though rent taxes would be progressive, con-
sumption taxes would be regressive, requiring compensating 
reductions in other regressive taxes or rebates for the poor. 
Water and electricity consumption, logging, mining, and 
ﬁshing would all decline somewhat. But everyone would 
gain from the overall effects: closer alignment between the 
means of public ﬁnance and public ends.
Adding It Up
Combining local congestion and land-value taxes; state and 
provincial pollution, land-value, and resource taxes; and 
national greenhouse gas taxes—all at the rates described 
in this book—would have yielded $29 billion in 1996, 
enough to offset 28 percent of all tax revenue collected 
in the Northwest. Counting existing fuel taxes, sin taxes, 
and other revenue sources that do not penalize work or 
investment, 39 percent of all government revenue collected 
in the region would have come from taxes on bads rather 
than goods.144
At the federal level, taxes on greenhouse gases would 
have generated $5.8 billion from the Northwest, one-third 
of it in B.C. These environmental taxes could have replaced 
60 percent of payroll taxes in British Columbia, and as much 
as 25 percent of payroll taxes in the Northwest states.145
In states and provinces, pollution, trafﬁc, resource, and 
land-value taxes levied at the rates described in this book 
for the year 1996—assuming 15 percent reductions in 































Figure 2. Sources of State, Provincial, and Local Revenue, 
Paciﬁc Northwest, 1996
Taxing “bads” at rates that reﬂect environmental costs would 
largely fund governments.
Sources: see Appendix.
scrapped the business and occupations tax and lowered the 
sales tax rate by more than half (see Appendix).
Of course, these calculations are all illustrations, not 
conclusive revenue projections. A real-world Northwest 
tax shift would be unlikely to end up with the speciﬁc tax 
rates assumed here. Indeed, it would probably begin very 
small; the largest environmental tax shift in the world to 
date, in Denmark, changed the source of only 2.5 percent 
of revenue. The important point is that taxing bads at rates 
that reﬂect environmental costs would largely fund local, 
provincial, and state governments. As a practical matter, 
however, tax reforms come in pieces, not wholes, so per-
fecting the grand design of a tax shift would be largely 
academic. More salient is to assess the strengths and weak-
nesses of the rough-hewn new taxes already described.146
Economy The beauty of tax shifting is that it promotes 
public goals, such as environmental protection, even while 
it spurs the economy by removing deadweight—the stiﬂing 
impacts of taxes on work, savings, investment, retail spend-
ing, and building. Taxes on resource rents or windfalls 
carry no deadweight losses. Pollution taxes and other taxes 
that improve the environment create some deadweight 
losses—for example, by discouraging enterprise in polluting 
industries. But because taxes on environmental harm reduce 
environmental costs in the economy—such as health-care 
costs for people sickened by pollution—these losses tend to 
be much smaller than those from taxes on labor or capital. 
Other new taxes might even lead to net economic gains by 
eliminating economically damaging activities. Land-value 
taxes push funds invested in unproductive speculation into 
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Carbon taxes would slow global warming, with all its at-
tendant human and environmental harm. And resource 
taxes would dampen the economy’s appetite for resources 
extracted from forests, mines, and rivers, taking pressure off 
natural ecosystems.  Exactly how much our environment 
would beneﬁt depends on the strength of the pollution 
productive investments. Trafﬁc taxes minimize the time, 
money, and resources squandered in gridlock. Overall, 
the tax shift we describe would have increased economic 
output by at least $5 billion, or 1.6 percent.147
Equity The impact of a tax shift on different income 
groups depends on the details. Land-value taxes, resource 
windfall taxes, and pollution taxes on businesses are progres-
sive; that is, the tax burden rises with ability to pay. Carbon, 
hydropower, motor vehicle pollution, and resource con-
sumption taxes—because they raise the prices of consumer 
goods—are either proportional or regressive. (Rebates for 
the poor would help: everyone would pay the full price of 
high-impact goods and services, but governments would 
distribute the average tax liability, perhaps $500 per person, 
to qualifying low-income families.) Reducing sales and 
payroll taxes would improve the fairness of the Northwest’s 
tax systems, and a tax shift would further help equity by 
spurring the economy, boosting the supply of affordable 
housing, and increasing wages.
Environment A tax shift would save hundreds, perhaps 
thousands, of lives each year by improving air and water 
quality, stemming trafﬁc, and curtailing the use of toxic 
substances. (Raising cigarette and alcohol taxes would 
save additional lives.) The environment would beneﬁt too. 
Pollution taxes would clean up our air, water, and land. 
Water taxes would help protect rivers and the salmon and 
other wildlife that depend on them. Trafﬁc and land-value 
taxes would reduce auto-related pollution and resource 
consumption and protect rural lands by braking sprawl. 
“Tax Shift?”  
 “After You.”
Would everybody have to shift taxes 
at the same time? In a global economy, 
how can a handful of states and prov-
inces, or even two countries, impose heavy taxes 
on pollution and resource consumption without simply put-
ting themselves at a competitive disadvantage?
In a tax shift, a few scurrilous polluters would probably 
relocate or shut down, but for all but a few industries, taxes 
on labor and capital hurt competitiveness much more than do 
taxes on pollution and resource consumption. The Northwest’s 
biggest exporters, by value, spend much more on brainpower 
than on raw materials, and would therefore beneﬁt from lower 
taxes on labor. Furthermore, trafﬁc taxes and land-value taxes 
would help competitiveness by speeding commerce and lower-
ing the price of rented building space.148
In fact, the ﬁrst jurisdictions to shift taxes—far from 
getting pummeled for it—might reap the largest economic 
rewards. Getting taxes out of the way of work and enterprise 
could turn early shifters into magnets for clean, nimble com-
panies at the vanguard of the economy.
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brand- new bureaus. And taxpayers would ﬁnd environ-
mental taxes simpler to comply with than corporate and 
personal income taxes.
Transition A tax shift could phase in new taxes gradually 
over several years, giving everyone time to adjust. A gradual 
transition would be especially important for the most vulner-
able communities. Towns that depend heavily on the most-
polluting facilities, industries that cater to the automobile, 
logging towns, and communities that beneﬁt from subsidized 
irrigation water would see their overall tax loads increase. 
But the simultaneous reductions in payroll, sales, income, 
and business taxes, and in property taxes on buildings, would 
provide some relief. And during the phase-in, everyone could 
aggressively pursue lower-impact practices.
Another reason for a gradual phase-in is to guarantee 
governments the revenue they need. Pollution and resource 
consumption taxes are unfamiliar tools of public ﬁnance; no 
one yet knows how much pollution and resource consump-
tion they will wring out of the economy. If people turn out 
to be exceptionally good at greening their lives and busi-
nesses, revenue from pollution and resource consumption 
taxes will decline somewhat. But trafﬁc congestion charges 
and taxes on land values are likely to generate growing 
revenue streams. A phase-in would give governments time 
to ﬁne-tune the tax system.
A phase-in would also give reformers time to guard 
against a potential weakness of environmental taxes: they 
can send strange incentives to government agencies, and 
even to citizens. The U.S. Forest Service and many North-
west counties have traditionally favored timber extraction 
taxes and how clever people turn out to be at preventing 
pollution and conserving resources. 
Administrative ease Some new taxes—such as electronic 
road tolls, pesticide taxes, and taxes on pumped ground-
water—would require new collection mechanisms, but 
most could piggyback on existing procedures. Pollution 
tax collection could buttress existing pollution reporting 
and fee requirements. Water taxes could rest on top of 
irrigation districts’ existing water delivery charges. Elec-
tricity taxes and carbon taxes could come in tandem with 
existing fuel and utility taxes. To carry the load of tax col-
lection, existing administrative procedures would require 
improvements—better stafﬁng, fuller enforcement—but few 
Think Globally, Shift Locally
Local jurisdictions have relatively few choices 
in tax policy, but that need not stop them from 
implementing tax shifts of their own. By law, 
Alaskan towns can include gasoline in their sales 
tax; Montana counties can tax both gasoline and natural re-
sources such as coal; Washington cities can tax parking lots; 
and Oregon and Washington counties can, with voter approv-
al, put slim taxes on gasoline. Since Washington law is am-
biguous about how cities can tax businesses, localities could 
tax businesses based on their pollution emissions, their solid 
waste bill, or their number of parking spaces. Throughout the 
region, localities can experiment with trafﬁc tolls, as Portland 
is hoping to do with federal support.149
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Tax Shifting with the 
Joneses 
How would a tax shift affect the Joneses? 
Though it’s tempting to claim that they 
would all be better off—after all, they are 
average northwesterners, and tax shifts will, on average, help 
more than they hurt—the truth is that it depends. It depends 
on where they live. Shifting property taxes onto land values 
will beneﬁt apartment dwellers more than owners of spacious 
urban lots. Offsetting payroll or sales taxes with carbon taxes 
will beneﬁt urban dwellers like Oregon and Washington more 
than rural resident Idaho, who logs more miles in his Ford 
F-150 pickup (the most popular wheels in his state) than his 
siblings do in their Honda Accords (the most popular in their 
states). It depends on where they work. Shifting business and 
payroll taxes onto pollution may hurt the manufacturing 
sector, but it will help the service sector, which employs most 
of the Joneses. It depends on how they spend their time and 
their money. The Joneses, whether or not they commute regu-
larly, will have to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of using tolls 
to reduce gridlock. And above all, it depends on their ability 
and willingness to change. The Joneses who can best adapt to 
new taxes—for instance, by purchasing energy-efﬁcient ap-
pliances, trading in a sport utility vehicle for a compact car, 
renting out an unused bedroom in their house, or carpooling 
instead of solo commuting—will gain the most ﬁnancially 
from a tax shift.151
over other uses of forestlands, probably because both the 
agency and the counties get to keep some timber sale pro-
ceeds, unlike other Forest Service revenues. Alaska’s reliance 
on royalties from the oil industry has made the state and 
its citizens receptive to new oil extraction proposals. On 
the other hand, such strange incentives are not ubiquitous. 
High tobacco and alcohol taxes do not seem to sway gov-
ernment bodies to support smoking or drinking. Still, the 
problem merits scrutiny.150
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The Boston Tea Party started a North American tradi-tion: the tax revolt. Rural rebellion against tariffs in the 
Populist era set in motion the reform process that led to 
the personal and corporate income taxes, which arguably 
made possible this century’s growth in national, provincial, 
and state governments. A few decades later, homeowners 
rebelling against rising property taxes limited the growth of 
state and local governments. People from many walks of life 
may lead the next tax revolt: a shift of taxes from “goods” 
to “bads.” Such reform could gather as much support from 
corporate boardrooms as from union halls, from public 
housing projects as from tree-lined streets, from environ-
mental activists as from champions of small business.
Tax shifts pursue liberal ends, such as ecological res-
toration and a living wage, by conservative means, such 
as relying on free markets and rewarding enterprise. Tax 
shifts pursue conservative ends, such as personal freedom 
and responsibility, by liberal means, such as making the 
polluter pay. Instead of the usual political or class divisions, 
tax shift politics are likely to divide people in unfamiliar 
ways, pitting service-sector businesses against resource in-
dustries, low-mileage drivers against high-mileage drivers, 
H O W  T O  G E T  I T conspicuous recyclers against conspicuous consumers, and 
developers against speculators.
In some parts of the Northwest—British Columbia, 
in particular—elected leaders may carry forward the tax 
shift revolt. If they do, they will certainly make the most 
popular changes ﬁrst: perhaps shifting a portion of business 
taxes onto major point-source polluters or lowering sales 
tax rates by extending the base to include pesticides. They 
may experiment with land-value taxes in areas zoned for 
commercial uses or in depressed neighborhoods desper-
ate for new development. Unless public ﬁnances explode 
into crisis, elected tax shifters will proceed cautiously and 
incrementally, and they will take steps to lower the political 
costs of tax shifting. They may put in grandfather clauses 
for older property owners or caps on tax increases for 
favored industries.
In other parts of the Northwest, especially in the 
American states, tax shifts may bypass elected repre-
sentatives through citizen initiatives. In Oregon and 
Washington, supermajority requirements for legislative 
tax proposals virtually guarantee that tax reform will have 
to come from popular votes on ballot measures. Polling-
place tax shifts are likely to be as piecemeal as legislative 
ones because complicated ballot measures rarely win voter 
approval. And major tax reforms in the histories of almost 
all the Northwest states have involved initiative campaigns 
that succeeded only after several attempts.
What could stop a tax revolt that makes so much sense? 
Those who proﬁt most from the existing tax system will no 
doubt try to stop it. These include, in the short term, land 
speculators, resource extractors and processors, and heavy 
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4. Remember that all tax dollars are not the same. Econo-
mists may think that a dollar’s a dollar, but everyone else 
seems to play favorites. Try to shift the burden onto taxes 
that are relatively popular (such as taxes paid by businesses 
and that “other people” will pay) and off the taxes that 
people hate most.
5. Keep trying. Oregonians approved the personal income tax 
on its sixth try. Property tax caps like California’s Proposi-
tion 13 have usually won only after several failed attempts. 
Some new taxes may face legal barriers. The courts might 
reject land-value taxes in Washington State because of 
ambiguous provisions in the state constitution. But the 
high-proﬁle lawsuit leading up to the decision would stim-
ulate public education and debate, building momentum for 
constitutional change.
6. Think big. The tax system is so unpopular that fundamental 
reform is not unthinkable. The bigger the shift, the more 
people will save.
7. Start small. The tax system is so powerful that even little 
changes—such as the “20/20” tax shifts for reducing motor 
vehicle pollution—can have large repercussions.
8. Say “Shift, shift, shift.” Many people will suspect that a 
tax shift is really a tax increase in disguise. Be sure to sepa-
rate the issue of what government taxes from the issue of 
how much it taxes.
Strategies for Tax Shifters
Tax reform, whether it comes from legislative 
halls or voting booths, is rarely pretty. German 
chancellor Otto von Bismarck said that the two 
things you don’t want to watch being made are 
laws and sausages. Here’s some advice for sausage makers.152
1. Plant seeds everywhere. Every level of government has 
opportunities to shift some portion of the tax burden off 
labor and capital and onto the gifts of nature. Waiting for a 
national shift may be less valuable than demonstrating the 
concept in counties, cities, states, and provinces. As history 
reveals, tax reform can be contagious: tax-writing commit-
tees often copy one another.
2. Organize your allies. Try to build a coalition out of the 
disparate forces—including businesses, labor unions, politi-
cal organizations, communities, and taxpayers—that lose big 
from the existing system and can win big from tax shifts.
3. Don’t write anyone off. Heavily polluting industries, for 
instance, might support taxes that target all polluters (in-
cluding nonpoint polluters such as drivers and farmers) as 
a way to level the playing ﬁeld. (Regulations tend to target 
factories and other point sources.) Within the high-impact 
industries, furthermore, interests are not monolithic. The 
cleanest and nimblest companies in polluting sectors of the 
economy may anticipate being able to beat the competition 
at keeping costs down, thus gaining an advantage.
Shift
This!
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Idaho Jones and the  
Tax Crusade 
Nothing unites the Joneses like a common 
enemy, and taxes are a frequent target of their 
anger. But knowing that roads, parks, police, and 
schools must be paid for somehow, they love to hate 
some taxes and merely hate others. Business and other taxes 
that they don’t pay directly escape their wrath. Sales and 
payroll taxes also go little noticed, their hefty tallies lost in a 
ﬂurry of receipts and pay stubs. Tax shifters targeting these 
taxes would do well to engage the Joneses in dialogue about 
the true shape of their tax burden. As it is, the Joneses’ most 
hated taxes are those that are new and those that have des-
ignated days of reckoning. The stateside Joneses direct their 
ire at property taxes and time-consuming income taxes. B.C. 
Jones probably hates these, too, plus the relatively new Cana-
dian value-added tax, the GST.153
polluters. But the short- and long-term beneﬁciaries, if they 
were organized, could ﬁnd ways to overcome these forces. 
Clean businesses in the service and technology industries, 
for example, employ seven times as many people in the 
Northwest as do the logging and mining industries.
The biggest obstacle to tax shifting is not likely to be 
its active opponents but its inactive one: habit. Accustomed 
to taxes as they are, most citizens are not shopping for fun-
damental reform. Voters are naturally conservative; they do 
not want to ﬁx things that are not broken. Existing taxes 
are the devil they know. Taxes on pollution, trafﬁc, sprawl, 
and resource consumption are a devil they don’t know. Of 
course, many citizens regarded sales and income taxes as 
the impractical schemes of wild-eyed dreamers back when 
customs duties funded our national treasuries.
In the end, a shift will beneﬁt us all: no one gains from 
a dying landscape and a hobbled economy. All that stands 
between us and a tax shift is a lot of natural skepticism. 
Enough leadership, organizing, and public dialogue—and 
a few crises (real or perceived)—will launch the next tax 
revolt. Indeed, incipient environmental levies enacted in 
recent years may be the equivalents of the 14-page trade 
law amendment that gave birth to the U.S. personal income 
tax. It all depends what we do next, and how many of us 
rise to do it.
A P P E N D I X
Tax and Other Revenue Collected in the Paciﬁc Northwest, 1996
(billions of U.S. and Canadian dollars*)
B.C. Idaho Ore. Wash. Alaska Calif. Mont.
Federal taxes
Personal income 9.0 2.2 7.2 15.1 1.8 78.1 1.5
Payroll 4.6 1.8 5.5 10.6 1.2 60.9 1.3
Corporate income 1.8 0.8 2.9 5.3 0.5 31.7 0.7
Value-added 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Motor fuels 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.1 3.3 0.2
Alcohol, tobacco 1.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 1.1 0.0
Subtotal Can$19.5 $5.0 $16.1 $31.6 $3.6 $175.1 $3.7
State, provincial, and local taxes
Personal income 5.0 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 21.5 0.4
Corporate income 1.8 0.2 0.5 1.6 0.4 5.9 0.1
Sales 2.9 0.6 0.0 5.4 0.1 25.0 0.0
Property 3.2 0.7 2.3 5.7 0.7 20.2 0.8
Environmental 4.9 0.4 0.9 2.6 2.5 9.2 0.4
Other 1.8 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.2 5.2 0.1
Subtotal Can$19.6 $2.7 $7.4 $16.1 $3.9 $87.0 $1.8
Total Can$39.1 $7.7 $23.5 $47.7 $7.5 $262.1 $5.5
Per capita Can$10,486 $6,460 $7,320 $8,630 $12,260 $8,220 $6,190
Selected tax rates (state, provincial, and local only)*
Property tax 0.8% 1.5% 1.3% 1.8% 1.0% 1.0% 2.0%
Sales tax 7.0% 5.0% 0.0% 8.2% 0.4% 7.3% 0.0%
Effective tax
on energy N/A 0.4% 2.1% 6.3% –0.4% 4.1% 1.6%
Cigarette tax
(U.S. cents/pack) 157 28 58 83 100 37 18
Beer tax
(U.S. cents/gal.) 10% 45 8 21 85 20 14
*Canadian to U.S. conversion at Can$1.4 = U.S.$1; energy tax rate for
1993; cigarette tax for 1998. Sources: see note 4.
Tax and Other Revenue Collected in the Paciﬁc Northwest, 
1996 (billions of U.S. and Canadian dollars)
  Canadi -t - . version at Can$1.40 = U.S $1.00; e  tax rate for 
1993; cigarette tax for 1998. Sources: see note 4.
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actual property tax revenue generated in 1996. For data 
sources, see note 4.
Carbon tax We assume tax rates per ton of carbon dioxide 
(and proportional taxes on other greenhouse gases) of $10 
at state or provincial level. (National tax of $100 per ton 
of carbon dioxide not included in tax shift scenario.) Data 
Details of Tax Shift Scenario
Labor, capital, environmental, and miscellaneous taxes 
Remainder of all or part of existing taxes.
Land-value taxes We assume a revenue-neutral shift of 
property taxes onto land values. Revenue is equivalent to 
 
Estimated Revenue from Tax Shift Scenario, Paciﬁc Northwest,
1996 (millions of U.S. and Canadian dollars)
B.C. Idaho Ore. Wash.
Labor and capital taxes
Business taxes 0 0 0 0
Personal income taxes 3,513 388 1,034 0
Retail sales taxes 0 0 0 2,314
Environmental taxes
(existing) 4,853 395 901 2,639
Miscellaneous 1,847 16 769 729
Land-value taxes 3,183 718 2,281 5,674
Carbon tax 271 46 110 228
Pollution taxes
Point sources 2,637* 161 276 790
Farm chemicals 30 224 130 327
Motor vehicles 495 162 373 602
Trafﬁc congestion taxes 700 0 500 1,000
Natural resource taxes
Water use N/A 288 150 168
Hydropower 1,414 183 668 1,471
Timber 445 32 115 100
Fish and game N/A 23 28 27
Minerals 246 40 26 61
Total Can$19,633 $2,676 $7,361 $16,131
Actual Local, State, and Provincial Revenue, Paciﬁc Northwest,
1996 (millions of U.S. and Canadian dollars)
B.C. Idaho Ore. Wash.
Labor and capital taxes
Business taxes 1,781 173 508 1,642
Personal income taxes 4,992 771 2,902 0
Retail sales taxes 2,977 603 0 5,447
Environmental taxes 
(detailed below) 4,853 395 901 2,639
Miscellaneous 1,847 16 769 729
Property taxes 3,183 718 2,281 5,674
Total Can$19,633 $2,676 $7,361 $16,131
Existing environmental taxes
Motor vehicles and fuels 1,174 250 595 1,380
Alcohol and tobacco 1,049 34 210 412
Timber 1,800 0 63 514
Water 268 0 0 0
Minerals 246 1 0 0
Fish and game 18 23 28 27
Electricity 115 3 3 227
Other 185 83 3 79
Subtotal Can$4,853 $395 $901 $2,639
 * B.C. pollution total is high in part because some U.S. water pollution data 
are unavailable and because toxic material listings differ between countries. 
See below for notes and sources.
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r10.html and from Vesna Kontic, Inventory of Authorized 
Discharges under the Waste Management Permit Fees Regulation 
1994/95–1995/96 (Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Environ-
ment, Lands and Parks, 1996). Revenue estimates assume 
a 15 percent reduction in emissions.
Other point-source water pollution taxes Data on 
economic costs of water pollution essentially nonexistent. 
Our rates—per ton taxes of $1,300 for biological oxygen 
demand (BOD) and $650 for suspended solids (SS)—based 
on Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, Reducing the Deﬁcit (cited 
above), which uses a tax of $1,300 per ton for BOD, and on 
the relative rates for BOD and SS in use in B.C. We include 
only data for B.C.; though EPA collects U.S. emissions data, 
we could not convert them to usable form. Also unavailable 
were data on nutrients and oil and grease, which, along with 
BOD and SS, are major nontoxic water pollutants. B.C. 
data for 1995–96 from Vesna Kontic, Inventory of Authorized 
Discharges (cited above). Revenue estimates assume a 15 
percent reduction in emissions.
Farm chemical taxes Data on economic costs of farm 
chemicals sparse to nonexistent. Our pesticide tax rate—av-
eraging $16,000 per ton but varying widely depending on 
pesticide—based on David Pimentel et al., “Environmental 
and Economic Costs of Pesticide Use,” BioScience, Nov. 
1992, who estimate costs of at least $8 billion from the $4 
billion spent on the 500,000 tons of pesticides used annu-
ally in the United States. Fertilizer tax rate of $75 per ton is 
approximately half of current U.S. fertilizer prices given in 
Harold Taylor, Fertilizer Use and Price Statistics, 1960–1993 
for 1994, from John C. Ryan, Over Our Heads: A Local Look 
at Global Climate (Seattle: NEW, 1997). Revenue estimates 
assume a 15 percent reduction in emissions.
Point-source toxic pollution taxes Data on economic 
costs of toxic emissions essentially nonexistent. Our rate—
which averages $16,000 per ton ($8 per pound) but would 
vary widely depending on pollutant—is four times lower 
than the $32.35 per pound average water toxics tax used 
in U.S. Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, Reducing the Deﬁcit: 
Spending and Revenue Options (Washington, D.C.: 1997; also 
at www.cbo.gov). Toxic emissions data for 1995, from Ofﬁce 
of Pollution Prevention and Toxics, 1995 Toxics Release 
Inventory: State Fact Sheets (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency [EPA], 1997), and Environment 
Canada, National Pollutant Release Inventory Summary Report 
1995 (Hull, Quebec: 1997). Revenue estimates assume a 
15 percent reduction in emissions.
Other point-source air pollution taxes A number of 
studies estimate the economic costs of air pollution. Our 
rates—per ton taxes of $11 for carbon monoxide (CO), 
$2,400 for oxides of nitrogen (NO
x
), $3,200 for particu-
late matter (PM10), $5,950 for oxides of sulfur (SO
x
), and 
$2,200 for volatile organic compounds (VOCs)—based on 
estimates from G. E. Bridges and Associates, Evaluation of 
External Costs Associated with Natural Gas Use, vol. 2, Sept. 
1991, cited in Transport 2021, The Cost of Transporting 
People in the British Columbia Lower Mainland (Vancouver, 
B.C.: Greater Vancouver Regional District, 1993). Data for 
1995–96 from EPA Region 10 at www.epa.gov/r10earth/
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(Washington, D.C.: Economic Research Service, Dept. of 
Agriculture, 1994). U.S. pesticide data are non-year-speciﬁc 
estimates for the early 1990s, from Leonard P. Gianessi and 
James Earl Anderson, Pesticide Use in Idaho Crop Production 
(Washington, D.C.: National Center for Food and Agricul-
tural Policy, 1995), and similar publications for Oregon and 
Washington. U.S. fertilizer data for 1996 from D. L. Terry 
and Paul Z. Yu, Commercial Fertilizers 1996 (Lexington, Ky.: 
Association of American Plant Food Control Ofﬁcials, 
1996). (Idaho fertilizer use estimated from surrounding 
states.) B.C. pesticide data for 1995 from Pollution Pre-
vention and Remediation Branch, Survey of Pesticide Use 
in British Columbia: 1995 (Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of En-
vironment, Lands and Parks, 1997). B.C. fertilizer data for 
1996 from Canadian Fertilizer Institute, Retail Sales Survey 
for Western Canada (Ottawa: 1996). Revenue estimates as-
sume a 15 percent reduction in emissions.





, and VOCs equivalent to those for point sources 
given above; air toxics ignored. We used PM10 instead of 
the more-appropriate PM2.5 because PM2.5 inventories 
were unavailable except for Douglas Lowenthal et al., CMB 
Source Apportionment During REVEAL (Regional Visibility 
Experiment in the Lower Fraser Valley): Final Report (Victoria: 
Air Resources Branch, Ministry of Environment, Lands and 
Parks, 1994). B.C. data for 1990 from Air Resources Branch, 
1990 British Columbia Emissions Inventory of Common Air Con-
taminants (Victoria, B.C.: Ministry of Environment, Lands 
and Parks, 1994). U.S. data for 1995 from Emissions Factors 
Inventory Group, Emissions Trends Viewer CD 1985–1995, 
version 1.0 (Washington, D.C.: EPA, Sept. 1996). Revenue 
estimates assume a 15 percent reduction in emissions.
Trafﬁc congestion taxes Figure of $1 billion for Seattle 
area based on Puget Sound Regional Council, Metropolitan 
Transportation Plan (Seattle: 1995). Estimates for Portland 
and Vancouver, B.C., based on Seattle ﬁgure and metro-
politan population comparisons with Seattle. 
Water taxes Data on economic costs of water use non-
existent. We use $20 tax per acre-foot, or about $0.06 per 
thousand gallons. B.C. data unavailable. U.S. data for 1995, 
from Wayne B. Solley, Preliminary Estimates of Water Use in 
the United States, 1995 (Reston, Va.: U.S. Geological Survey, 
1997; also at www.usgs.gov). Revenue estimates assume a 15 
percent reduction in emissions.
Hydropower taxes Data sparse on the economic costs of 
dams. We use 0.5 cent per kilowatt-hour (kWh). We assume 
rent capture will bring in another 1 cent per kWh, for a 
total of 1.5 cents per kWh. Data for 1996 from Statistics 
Canada, CANSIM (Canadian Socio-Economic Information 
Management System) database, “Electric Power Statistics in 
British Columbia” and “Electric Power Statistics in Canada” 
(www.statcan.ca), and from U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy In-
formation Administration, Electric Power Annual 1996, vol. 1 
(Washington, D.C., 1997; also at www.eia.doe.gov).
Timber taxes We use $20 tax per thousand board feet. U.S. 
and B.C. data for 1992 from U.S. Forest Service, USFS Re-
source Bulletin PNW-RB-202 (Washington, D.C.: 1994).
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Fish taxes We assume that rent capture will double exist-
ing revenues. For data sources, see note 4.
Minerals We assume that rent capture will double existing 
revenues in B.C. (sources in note 4). U.S. revenue ﬁgures 
assume 10 percent tax on mineral value, using 1995 data 
from Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States 1996 (Washington, D.C.: 1996).
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